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ImRODUCTION
[T]oday, in the final third of this century, we are still trying to
operate the courts with fundamentally the same basic methods,
the same procedures and the same machinery that Roscoe Pound
said were not good enough in 1906.
In the supermarket age we are with few exceptions operating
the courts with cracker-barrel, corner-grocer methods and equip-
ment, vintage 1900....
More money and more judges alone is not the primary solution
to the problems of the courts. Some of what is wrong is due to
the failure to apply the techniques of modern business to the
purely mechanical operation of the courts-of modern record keep-
ing and systems planning for handling the movement of the
cases.
Some is also due to antiquated and rigid procedures which not
only permit delay but encourage it....
With increasing urgency, my distinguished predecessors from
Chief Justices Taft and Hughes to Chief Justice Earl Warren have
pressed these matters vigorously.'
This passage comes from an address entitled "The State of the
Federal Judiciary," which Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, recently delivered in St. Louis at the
annual meeting of the American Bar Association. In this speech
Chief Justice Burger lamented the failure of many lawyers and
judges to view the federal courts as judicial bureaucracies. More-
over, he deeply feared a possible consequence of this failure: the
inability of these courts to function.2  Although he confined his
apprehension to the federal court system, he could readily have ex-
tended the purview of his alarm to the fifty state trial court sys-
tems where the possibility of breakdowns may be more imminent
and more consequential; for most cases begin and terminate there.
1. What's Wrong with the Courts: The Chief Justice Speaks Out, U.S.
NEws AN WORLD REP., Aug. 24, 1970, at 68 [hereinafter cited as U.S.
NEWS].
2. Id. at 68, 71.
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Nonetheless, his address may have two principal immediate effects.
First, it tends to legitimize the need for legal scholars, court officials,
and practitioners to view state trial courts as judicial bureaucracies
rather than as autonomous islands in an archipelego filled with
other isolated courts, police organizations, and correctional facili-
ties. Second, his personal prestige with members of the legal pro-
fession may help actuate them to study and revamp the state and
federal judiciaries, especially at the trial level.
This study exhaustively probes into the state trial court systems
as faltering bureaucracies. It explores them from two main per-
spectives. First, it takes a macroview of them by exploring their
increasing public visibility and their neglect by legal scholars.
Second, it affords a microview of them by ferreting out their prin-
cipal internal and external bureaucratic problems. Therefore, the
writer decided to divide this study into four sections: introduction,
macroview, microview, and prospects for this field of inquiry.
Methodologically, the study rests on three main bases: a historical
approach to the literature on judicial bureaucracies; survey work
in Cook County, Illinois, and in San Diego County, California; and a
legal approach by considering the laws and courts' rules on this
subject. Furthermore, this article delves into the problems of such
organizations primarily from a national perspective and secondarily
from the vantage point of California, the most populated state in the
nation. Having begun this odyssey, let us now turn to the second
section of this study: a macroview of state trial courts as faltering
bureaucracies.
II.
A MACROVIEW OF STATE TRIAL CoUrmS
As FALTmuNG BuREAUcRACIEs
A. The Increasing Visibility of Their Failures
It is commonly assumed that ... law enforcement (police,
sheriffs, marshalls), the judicial process (judges, prosecutors, de-
fense lawyers) and corrections (prison officials, probation and
parole officers) ... add up to a 'system' of criminal justice.
A system implies some unity of purpose and organized inter-
relationship among component parts. In the typical American
city and state and under federal jurisdiction as well, no such rela-
tionship exists.3
3. NATIONAL Commi£ssiox ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION or VIOLENcE;
To EsTABLIsH JUSTICE, To INsuRE DolvEsTIc TRANQUILITY 128 (1970).
This statement from the final report of the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence views state trial courts
as one segment of a criminal justice system. In this article the au-
thor limits his examination mainly to this one segment. More
specifically, he explores some increasingly visible, significant fail-
ures of the many state trial courts.
The most visible recent symbol of widespread disaffection in judi-
cial systems has centered on the United States Supreme Court. For
the last sixteen years much public criticism has focused on its de-
cisions in the areas of race, religion, reapportionment, and crim-
inal justice.4 Commentators have publicly charged the Court with
numerous shortcomings such as a lack of judicial restraint, sweep-
ing opinions, hastiness in reaching decisions, disregard of prece-
dents, and no support for many of its assertions. Most recently,
the Court has attracted a swirl of popular attention regarding two
justices (Abe FortasO and William 0. Douglas7) and two nominees
(Clement Haynsworth s and G. Harold Carswell9).
Although less illuminated than the highest national court, some
lower federal courts have also encountered recent, widespread pub-
licity, much of which was adverse. The most notable recent in-
stance was the federal district court in Chicago where Judge Julius
Hoffman presided over what was commonly labeled "The Chicago 7
Conspiracy Trial". His alleged partiality toward the prosecution
and stern contempt citations against the defendants resulted in se-
vere criticism of him.10
Moreover, even state supreme courts have become symbols, albeit
less visible ones, of judicial disillusionment. For instance, in 1969,
two members of the Illinois Supreme Court resigned after a special
court commission had found them guilty of positive acts of impro-
priety. Both justices had acquired stock in a Chicago bank while
4. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1969, at 1, 24. See also A. BIcxEL, PoLiTics AND
THE WARREN COURT at x-xi, 133, 139, 146 (1965) for more extensive com-
mentary.
5. Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less and Explain More, N.Y.
Times, June 6, 1968, § 6 (Magazine) at 34-35, 122, 124-25.
6. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1968, at 1; N.Y. Times, October 3, 1968, at 1;
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1969, at 1.
7. N.Y. Times, May 24, 1969, at 1; N.Y. Times, April 14, 1960, at 1.
8. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1969, at 1.
9. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1970, at 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 1, 14; N.Y .Times, Mar. 29, 1970, § 6
(Magazine) at 10, 11, 33-35, 37, 41, 47, 52; Kelven, Chicago Howler, TH
NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 7, 1970, at 21-23.
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the state supreme court was reviewing criminal indictments against
an official of that bank.11
These episodes illustrate that the problems confronting the fed-
eral courts and the state appellate courts receive at most sporadic
public attention. Generally their defects remain invisible to most
citizens. The least public illumination is given to the shortcomings
of the numerous state trial courts, even though it is at this level
that the most pervasive and intractable problems of the criminal
justice system lie. Ironically such courts are the most salient but
least visible institutions. The public attention afforded them is
sporadic, local, and ephemeral. Frequently it results from a court
scandal,'2 a sensational murder trial,13 the killing of a judge,
14
courtroom disruptions,' 5 court bombings,16 the public comments of
a prestigious leader,' 7 the public remarks of political candidates,' 8
a feature article by a popular magazine,' 9 the judicial handling of
cases arising from civil disorders, 20 and disputes between judges
and police. 2'
Therefore, most of the disaffection with the judicial system is
misplaced; for there is probably an inverse relationship between the
visibility of courts and their impact on the public. The overwhelm-
ing number of cases begin and end in state trial courts.22 Because
so few cases are appealed due to considerations of time, money, ef-
fort, and an improbability of a reversal, critics who continue to ex-
coriate appellate courts, like the United States Supreme Court, are
11. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 1, 1969, § 1, at 4; Los Angeles Times, Aug.
18, 1969, § 1, at 10. The justices were Roy J. Sofisburg and Ray I. Kling-
biel.
12. Chicago Tribune, May 12, 1967, § 1 at 1; Chicago Tribune, Sept. 15,
1967, § 1, at 1.
13. Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1970, § 1, at 1.
14. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 9, 1970, § A, at 1.
15. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1970, at 53; Oakland Tribune, Sept. 4, 1970, at 1;
San Diego Union, Oct. 9, 1970, § B, at 5.
16. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1970, at 1.
17. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1970, at 1.
18. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 17, 1970, § 1, at 3.
19. Wittner, Logjam in our Courts, LIi, Aug. 7, 1970, at 18-25.
20. Los Angeles Times, June 13, 1970, § 1, at 1; Los Angeles Times,
July 21, 1970, § 2, at 3.
21. Los Angeles Times, July 17, 1970, § 1, at 3; San Diego Evening Tri-
bune, July 17, 1970, § A, at 1-2.
22. J. FRA x, COURTS ON TRm: THE MYTH AnD REALIT or AAacAN
JusTIcE 222-24 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FRANK].
indulging in what the eminent jurist Jerome Frank called the
"6upper court myth. '2 3  This belief assumes that most trial court
injustices can be corrected on appeal and that most cases are ap-
pealed. Neither supposition is probably valid.
State trial courts have long been salient because of at least three
enduring (albeit unpublicized) considerations. First, the state trial-
court structures, especially their management problems, deserve
more public attention because of their sheer magnitude; for they
easily dwarf the state appellate systems as well as the entire federal
judiciary.24 Such trial courts employ thousands of judges and staff
personnel, handle millions of criminal and civil cases each year,
25
and spend several hundred million dollars annually.26 Further-
more, the size of such systems derives from their position as the
starting and terminal points of most litigation.27 Because extensive
time, money, and effort are necessary, very few decisions are ap-
pealed. Second, such systems, largely because of their size, gener-
ate serious interest-academic as well as public-in their efficiency
and output.28 In particular, scholars and public officials need to
explore how numerous devices may promote greater court effi-
ciency (as measured by the speedier termination of criminal and
civil litigation).29 Third, such courts are worthy of thorough in-
vestigation because of their pervasive impact on public policy.
Such courts usually constitute an integral segment of the local
political system and, by their decisions in criminal and civil cases,
often make critical reallocations of power within that system. As
political scientist Kenneth M. Dolbeare states, "the local trial court
is ... one of several institutions affecting the who gets what, when,
23. Id. at 222.
24. K. DOLBEARE, TRIAL COURTS IN URBAN PoLITIcs 2 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as DOLBEARE]. See also, H. JACOB, JUSTICE IN AMERICA 17-25 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as JACOB]; J. KLONESKI & R. MENDELSOHN, THE PoLITICS
OF LOCAL JUSTICE 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KLONESKI & MENDELSOHN];
R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR 2 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WATSON & DOWNING].
25. INsT. oF JUDICIAL ADmIN., CALENDAR STATUS STUDY-1969, STATE TRIAL
COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION PERSONAL INJURY CASES, Vi-iX (1969);
A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55-58, 122-23 (1960); Barrett, Criminal
Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC
AND THE LAW Exs.osIoN 107-08, 111 (H. Jones ed. 1965) [herein-
after cited as THE COURTS].
26. INsT. OF JUDICIAL ADmIN. STATE Am LocAL FNANcING OF TE CouRTs
(TENTATIE REPORT) 8, 11 (1969).
27. DOLBEARE supra note 24, at 2-3; FRANK, supra note 22, at 254-61;
WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 24, at 2.
28. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies
in THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 56-58.
29. Id. at 57.
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and how of local politics .... "30 This impact runs deeper in urban
areas because grave public policy issues more often come before the
trial courts. Moreover, enhancing this impact is the discretion of
their judges in construing and applying upper-court doctrines, in
effecting their own procedures, and in regulating their own work-
loads.3 1 However, two political scientists, James R. Kionoski and
Robert I. Mendelsohn, note that typically "the student of judicial
administration makes little attempt to study the relationship be-
tween the political, social, and economic environments and the op-
eration of the legal system."3 2
During the last six years these courts have achieved increasing,
but irregular, national visibility. For example, according to legal
scholar Edward L. Barrett, Jr., the prosecution of four-hundred San
Francisco civil-rights demonstrators in 1964 helped to publicize trial
court backlogs and the excessive dependency of such courts on
guilty pleas to reduce their caseloads. During these prosecutions,
the defendants' attorneys made numerous motions to dismiss the
misdemeanor cases, refused to enter guilty pleas, and demanded
jury trials. Consequently, municipal court judges faced protracted
litigation and could not handle other important criminal and
civil cases on their calendars. Furthermore, Barrett argued that a
small increase in the number of not-guilty pleas would paralyze
the already overburdened courts.
33
The mass prosecutions of university demonstrators has further
exposed the same grave shortcomings of trial courts to public scru-
tiny. For example, in early 1965, 773 persons were tried for various
misdemeanors (such as trespassing, failure to disperse, and resist-
ing arrest) which they had been charged with committing in De-
cember 1964 during a sit-in demonstration by the Free Speech Move-
ment in Sproul Hall, the administration building of the University
of California at Berkeley. Like the prosecuted civil-rights demon-
strators, 690 of the 773 defendants also refused to plead guilty and
thereby slowed municipal court operations for almost seven
months.34
30. DOLBEARE, supra note 24, at 3.
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. KLOEos I & M1N]sELsOmz supra note 24, at 7.
33. THE CoumTs, supra note 25, at 110-11.
34. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1965, at 29; N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1965, at 13; N.Y.
The extensive prosecutions of persons demonstrating against
Ameiican participation in the Vietnam war revealed trial court
shortcomings on a more national rather than local basis. For in-
stance, during Stop-the-Draft week (October 16-20, 1967), hundreds
of demonstrators were arrested in eight cities: Boston; Cincinnati;
Ithaca, New York; New York City; Oakland; Philadelphia; and Port-
land, Oregon. In Oakland, for example, 218 demonstrators were
prosecuted for several misdemeanors and felonies. Two months
later 207 protesters were prosecuted for various misdemeanors.
Like their civil rights and university counterparts, the anti-war
demonstrators employed the same tactics, one principal effect of
which was to aggravate the criminal and civil caseloads of numer-
ous trial courts.3 5
Not only have these events afforded sporadic national attention
to the problems of state trial courts, but also four commission re-
ports have given additional illumination to the problems facing
these tribunals. First, according to the National Advisory Commis-
sion on Civil Disorders, the riots in eight American cities during
Summer 1967 not only immobilized the local trial courts with a
spate of cases but also publicized three other notable failures in
such courts: the many delayed arraignments; the lack of numerous,
competent defense attorneys; and the inconsistent sentencing of de-
fendants convicted of the same offenses. 6 Furthermore, the Com-
mission furnished a bleak summary of trial court weaknesses ag-
gravated by these disorders:
Normal screening procedures were overrun in the chaos of the
major disorders. Rational decisions to prosecute, delay prosecu-
tion on good behavior, or dismiss, to release with or without bail
pending trial, to accept a plea to a lesser charge or to press for
conviction on the original charge, to impose a just sentence-all
require access to a comprehensive file of information on the of-
fender contributed by police, prosecution, defense counsel, bail
interviewers and probation officers. Orderly screening requires
time, personnel and deliberation. These elements were absent in
the court processing of participants in the major riots.87
Second, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice gave national publicity to another defect
Times, Apr. 2, 1965, at 21; N.Y. Times, July 20, 1965, at 13; N.Y. Times,
July 30, 1965, at 54.
35. J. SKoLNIcK, TE PoLrTcs OF PROTEST 69 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as SKoLNcK]; N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1967, at 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1967, at
8; N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1967, at 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1967, at 9; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 19, 1967, at 6.
36. NAT'L ADVISORY Comm'N ON Civir DisOatEas, THE REPORT OF THE NA-
T ONAL A.UVIsORY Co1mnIsslox OF CIVIL DISORDERs 341-44 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as NAT'L Comm'].
37. Id. at 340.
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in the state trial courts: their antiquated business procedures.
This commission commented:
In an age when new management techniques and business ma-
chines have revolutionized many business and government opera-
tions, the courts' business procedures have remained in most
places very much like those of a former age. The use of multiple
longhand entries, cumbersome dockets, and filing and indexing
systems with limited retrieval capacity persists in many courts
because the volume of cases has not been so great as to cause the
system to break down. Increasing urbanization has placed great
new pressures upon the courts, however, and has highlighted the
inadequacy and obsolescence of the business methods used.38
Third, the Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence has generated national interest
in the qualitative as well as the quantitative flaws in the state trial
courts. For instance, Skolnick's staff found that, in cities such as
Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and Washington, D.C., trial judges arbi-
trarily set high bails during crises to achieve the preventive deten-
tion of arrestees rather than to help assure a defendant's appear-
ance at his trial. Moreover, his staff discovered that not only arbi-
trarily high bails but also the denial of the right to counsel char-
acterized routine as well as crisis situations. Furthermore, such
courts have tended to become derelict in supervising other govern-
mental agencies and insuring that such bodies operate lawfully
some of the time, especially during disorders.3 9
Fourth, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence cited additional widespread criticisms of state trial
courts, especially in their disposition of criminal cases:
[C]riminal courts themselves are often poorly managed and se-
verely criticized. They are seriously backlogged; in many of our
major cities the average delay between arrest and trial is close to
a year. All too many judges are perceived as being inconsiderate
of waiting parties, police officers and citizen witnesses. Too often
lower criminal courts tend to be operated more like turnstiles than
tribunals.4 O
The four commission reports as well as the three events cited
above contain at least six implications regarding the shortcomings
38. PaRsmmT's ComM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TE ADMN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 379-80 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COmm'N]
39. SKOLNICK, supra note 35, at 313-16.
40. NAT'L COIVIV'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE; To EsTAB-
LisH JUSTICE, To INSURE DomEsTIC TRANQUILITY 130 (1970).
of state trial courts generally:
1. Their public impact is far greater than their visibility.
2. The public attention given to state trial courts has been inter-
mittent, usually following serious outbreaks of domestic tur-
moil.
3. Their problems are ideological as well as technical.
4. Such courts will not necessarily function better if they accel-
erate their disposition of cases, for one must consider the
quality as well as the quantity of decisions rendered.
5. Such courts function almost as badly during tranquil situa-
tions as they do during domestic crises.
6. Their problems are not peculiar to certain states or metro-
politan areas but are endemic to the nation.
B. The Neglect of State Trial Court Bureaucracies by Scholars
The study of judicial management by scholars probably falls
within the ambit of three disciplines: law, political science, and
public administration. However, academicians in these fields have
neglected to examine this area and one of its most critical segments:
state trial court bureaucracies. Law professors and political scien-
tists have tended to devote almost exclusive attention to the study
of substantive and procedural case law and have tended to ignore
the managerial problems of judicial organizations at all levels. 1
Lawyers and judges are often too preoccupied with their daily work
to explore this area meticulously.42 Public administration scholars
have usually centered their attention on managerial problems con-
fronting the executive branches of government at the federal, state,
and local levels.
43
41. For example, a check of the INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICAL LIr-
ERATOR and the SoCIAL SciENCEs Am HumANT INDEX reveals that, be-
tween 1907 and Dec. 1969, only seven articles focusing mainly on judicial
management have been published in the major journals of political science:
Jameson, Current Problems Affecting the Judicial Branch, 11 WESTERm
POL. Q. 713-23 (1958); Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J. Pot. 456-76
(1962); Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 Am. PoL.
Sci. Ruv. 1017-31 (1959); Saby, Simplified Procedure in Municipal Courts,
18 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 760-72 (1924); Schaeffer, Management in the Judici-
ary, 13 PuB. AD. REV. 89-96 (1953); Sikes, The Work of Judicial Councils,
29 Am. POL. SCL Rnv. 456-72 (1935); Sunderland, The Judicial Council as
an Aid to the Administration of Justice, 35 Am. POL. Sci. R v. 905-53
(1941).
42. J. CAR=N, LAWYERS ON THEIR OwN 41 (1962); JACOn, supra note 24,
at 80-85.
43. For example, the only article in a public administration journal cen-
tering on judicial management is Schaeffer's, note 41 supra.
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One may measure the neglect of the study of judicial manage-
ment by these scholars in at least three ways. First, in the INTEmA-
TIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE (I.t.P.L.) and in the SoCIAL
SCIENCE AND HuANITIEs INDEX (S.S.H.I.), between 1910 and Decem-
ber 1969, the author found only thirty-two articles directly germane
to this field. This output averages approximately one article every
two years. Of these thirty-two articles, eighteen (62.1 percent)
were published since 1950 and indicate that even the sparse interest
in this field is recent.4 Furthermore, of these thirty-two articles,
only seven were published in the major journals of policial sci-
ence.
45
Second, in the PuBLIc AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE (P.A.I.S.) dur-
ing the same fifty-nine year period, the author uncovered 103 ar-
ticles which focused directly on judicial management.46 This out-
put averages about two articles a year. In this source the author
found more than three times as many articles on judicial manage-
ment than in the first two sources mainly because P.A.I.S. in-
dexes an average of approximately five times as many periodicals as
I.I.P.L. or S.S.H.I. does.47 Furthermore, unlike the first two sources,
P.A.I.S. cites an overwhelming number of articles (89.3 percent)
from legal journals because it has indexed far more legal periodicals
than the other two sources have.
48
Third, the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS (I.L.P.) and the INDEX TO
LEGAL PERIODICAL LIERATURE (I.L.P.L.) contain the bulk (98.0 per-
cent) of the articles in judicial management published between
1910 and 1969 and signify that this sector has been an almost ex-
clusive preoccupation of the legal profession. However, even in
this profession, interest in judicial management has increased
44. Derived from 1-18 INTERNATIONAL INDEX TO PERIODICAL LITERATURE
(1907-Mar. 1965) [hereinafter cited as I.I.P.L.]; 19-22 SOCIAL SCIENCES
AND HumANTnIEs INDEX (Apr. 1965-Dec. 1969) [hereinafter cited as S.S.H.I.].
45. See note 41 supra.
46. Derived from 1-54 THE PuBrc AFAncs INFORMATION SERVICE (1915-
Dec. 1969) [hereinafter cited as P.A.I.S.].
47. See notes 44 & 46 supra. In 1969 P.A.I.S. listed 971 journals; TRE
INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS [hereinafter cited as I.L.P.] and THE INDEX
TO LEGAL PERIODICAL Lrr1xTURE [hereinafter cited as I.L.P.L.], 313; I.I.P.L.
and S.S.H.L., 210. Their respective mean listings between 1890 and 1969
were 850, 167, and 173.
48. Of the 32 journals in P.A.I.S. (1969) citing articles on judicial man-
agement, 27 (84.4%) are legal journals; 8 (9.4%), political science journals;
and 2 (6.2%), miscellaneous journals.
sharply only since 1950; for 62.2 percent of all articles on this sub-
ject listed in I.L.P. and I.L.P.L. have been published since that date.
(See Figure 1.) Finally, the author formed a composite picture of
the output in this sector by eliminating the duplicated citations and
by examining all the above-mentioned indices under the following
titles: administration of justice, courts, judges, judicial councils,
and justice. (See Figure 1.)
Figure 1




Years Journals Journals Journals Total
1960-1969 405 (98.8%) 3 (0.7%) 2 (0.5%) 410
1950-1959 462 (97.7%) 8 (1.7%) 3 (0.6%) 473
1940-1949 136 (97.8%) 2 (1.5%) 1 (0.7%) 139
1930-1939 224 (98.3%) 1 (0.4%) 3 (1.3%) 228
1920-1929 106 (98.0%) 1 (1.0%) 1 (1.0%) 108
1910-1919 39 (92.9%) 3 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%) 42
Totals 1,372 (100.0%) 18 (100.0%) 10 (100.0%) 1,400
( 98.0%) ( 1.3%) ( .7%) (100%)
Sources: Derived from the INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALS Vol. 1-15 (1926-
December, 1969); AN INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICAL LITERTURE Vol.
4-6 (1908-1937); INTERATIONAL INDEx TO PRODICAL LITERATURE
Vol. 1-18 (1907-March, 1965); SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
INDEx Vol. 19-22 (April, 1965-December, 1969); PUBLIC AFFAIRs
INFoRmATIoN SERVICE Vol. 1-54 (1915-December, 1969).
Hr.
A MICROVIEW OF STATE TRAL COURTS AS FALTERING BUREAUCRACIES:
THE PmNciCAL FACETS OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT
A study of judicial management entails consideration of at least
eight principal facets: court organization (or consolidation); the
abolition of fee offices (mainly justices of the peace); judicial lead-
ership; court congestion (or delay); staff functions; judicial selec-
tion and tenure; judicial discipline, removal, and retirement; and
the operational co-ordination of courts and the other segments of
the justice system. Because there is no consensus about the param-
eters of this field, this typology is a synthesis of germane rubrics
gleaned from some standard works49 and some recent symposia in
49. THE SECTION ON JUDICIAL ADmI., A.B.A., THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE vii-xi (4th ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
THE SECTION ON JUDICIAL ADNmi.]; A. VANDERBILT, MINIUM STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATIoN vii-xi (1949) [hereinafter cited as A. VANDER-
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this area.50 Let us now turn to the first main aspect: court or-
ganization.
A. Judicial Organization (or Consolidation): The Framework for
Management
Judicial organization is considered first because it sets the frame-
work for judicial management on a systemic rather than an indi-
vidualistic basis. Such: organization, synonymous with consolida-
tion, entails the replacement of numerous, independent trial courts
with overlapping jurisdiction.51  (See Figure 2.) Despite a con-
sensus on its efficacy, such consolidation has proceeded along two
complementary tributaries. First, twenty states have so far con-
solidated their trial courts but have let such courts operate without
extensive management by the state supreme court (or its chief jus-
tice) . 52 Each consolidated trial court receives its direction solely
or mainly from its chief judge. (See Figure 3.) Second, fourteen
states not only have consolidated their trial courts to date but also
have subjected them to supervision by the state supreme court (or
its chief justice), which manages the entire state court system
through its staff agency, the court administrator's office. 53 (See
Figures 2-3.)
California has mainly followed the second tributary by partially
consolidating its trial courts in 195054 by placing their management
under the supervision of a Judicial Council 5 and in 1964 under
presiding judges. 56 Although this state reduced the different kinds
BILT]; SELECTED READINGS ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVE-
MENT (G. Winters & S. Sunwall eds. 1966) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED
READINGS].
50. A Symposium: Judicial Administration, 4 WILL. L.J. 1-103 (1966);
A Symposium, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 1063-1178 (1966); A Symposium: Social
Science Approaches to the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551-1628
(1966); Special Issue-Court Administration, 50 JUDICATURE 256-60 (1967).
51. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 46 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 62 (1962); Pound, Organization of Courts,
11 J. Amv. JuD. Soc'y 78 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Pound].
52. The Judiciary, THE BooK oF THE STATES 1968-1969 at 118 (Council
on State Government, 1968) [hereinafter cited as The Judiciary].
53. Id. at 103-04, 118.
54. JUDcIIA CouNcIL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTEENTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 13-14 (1953) (hereinafter cited as JuDicIAL
CoUNcIL OF CALIFORNIA].
55. Id. at 13, 15-16.
56. CALIFoRwNA RULES OF COURT §§ 1-2 (West 1969).
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Source: Derived from Ill. Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 (1870).
Figure 3
Steps toward Judicial Consolidation
in the States: 1969
Step 1: Step 2: Step 3: Step 4:
States Abolition Consoli- Inclusion
with of Justices dation of Consoli-
Court of the Peace of Trial dated Trial
Admini- or their Ju- Courts Courts into
strator's dicial Func- per se Statewide
Offices tions Unified Court
Year System
1925-1929 1 0 0 0
1930-1934 0 0 0 0
1935-1939 1 1 0 0
1940-1944 1 0 0 0
1945-1949 1 2 1 1
1950-1954 6 1 1 1
1955-1959 11 8 5 3
1960-1964 5 10 9 6
1965-1969 9 6 4 3
Total
States 35 28 20 14
Sources: Derived from THE Boox OF THE STATES (1970), at 117-118. This
chart is not represented as a Guttman scale because of its fairly
low coefficient of reproducibility (0.75), which is well below
the currently accepted minimum of 0.90. See L. Anderson, M.
Watts, and A. Wilcox, LEGISLATIVE RoLL-CALL ANALYSIS at 112
(1966).
of trial courts from eight to three (Superior, Municipal, and Jus-
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tice),57 no subsequent legislative (and constitutional) efforts have
been made to achieve full unification of its trial courts.
58
Both kinds of consolidation have moved state judicial organiza-
tions in differing degrees toward the achievement of at least three
significant objectives.59 One aim has been to reduce trial court
congestion, which was worsening partly because plaintiffs often
filed their cases in two or more trial courts simultaneously. Fre-
quently, plaintiffs did not know which court could hear their cases
first. A second objective was to reduce the number of cases where
plaintiffs often failed to receive decisions on the merits of their
claims solely because they had filed complaints in the wrong court.
A third aim was to promote uniform procedures in all trial courts. 0
Although a consensus about the value of both consolidational
modes exists within the legal profession, such reorganizations are
unlikely to be made in all the states within the next several years.
If the first type of unification continues in accordance with the
trend of the last fifteen years, all the states will have undergone
this change by 1997.61 If the latter mode of consolidation proceeds
at its post-1955 rate, this change will take place by 2018.62 In the
author's view, at least four factors may accelerate or slow either
trend. One factor is the efficacy of this change in other states,
for successful court reorganization in some states generates an im-
petus for emulation by other states. A second is reductions in crim-
inal and civil delays which might follow consolidation. Despite
a lack of empirical evidence correlating delay reductions with con-
solidation, the former changes would generally be ascribed to the
57. JuDicTAL CouNcIL OF CALiFoRN A, supra note 54 at 14-16.
58. CALFOIiA LEGISLATuRE-FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATVE BusnqEss-
HISTORY AND INDEX OF ALL SENATE AND ASSEmBLY BILLS (1970). A check of
this source between 1950 and 1970 under the titles "Consolidation," "Courts,"
"Merger," "Organization," and "Reorganization," disclosed no proposed
constitutional amendments to achieve the full consolidation of the Califor-
nia judicial system had been introduced into either house of the state legis-
lature.
59. Vines, Courts as Political and Governmental Agencies, in PowTics IN
THE AamEPicAN STATES 247 (H. Jacob & K. Vines eds. 1965).
60. PRESiDENT's Co m'N, supra note 38, at 322-23; NAT'L ComMV'N, supra
note 36, at 337-38.
61. This projection was calculated as follows: 15 years/18 states =
X/32 remaining states. X = 27. 1970 plus 27 = 1997.
62. This projection was calculated as follows: 15 years/12 states =
X/38 remaining states. X = 47.5. 1970 plus 48 = 2018.
latter. A third is the strength of the fee officers' lobbies in many
states, for such officers view consolidation as a threat to their fi-
nancial success and their operational autonomy.03 A fourth consid-
eration is the aggravation of judicial problems so quickly and per-
vasively as to outmode this proposed solution.
B. The Abolition of Fee Offices: The Complement of Judicial Or-
ganization
Although a political scientist might treat the abolition of fee of-
fices (such as justices of the peace, police magistrates, and con-
stables at the state level and United States Commissioners at the
national level) as a segment of judicial organization, this area is
large enough to be considered separately. A consensus about the
role of fee officers in judicial organizations has existed among law-
yers for many years. The consensus is that such offices (most of
which are justices of the peace) should be abolished and that their
duties should be absorbed by consolidated trial courts. At least
three considerations underlie this position. First, such officers
often keep few, if any, records; favor litigants bringing them busi-
ness; and lack consistently fair procedures. Second, such officers
are generally not licensed attorneys and thus lack even the most
rudimentary qualification for holding their positions. Finally, these
officers tend to aggravate the backlogs in the trial courts of record
because retrials (trials de novo) are often necessary on appeal from
decisions by such officers. 6
4
So far twenty-eight states have abolished their fee offices or the
judicial functions of them. (See Figure 3.) Fifteen have elimi-
nated this office entirely whereas the remaining thirteen have con-
tinued only the nonjudicial functions of these offices.05
On the other hand, California, has retained this office (Justice
Courts) and its judicial functions66 but since 1966, has made two
significant alterations: the substitution of salaries in lieu of fees67
and the requirement that nominees for such offices pass a com-
petence examination approved by the Judicial Council.08  More-
63. See, e.g., J. GAzELL & H. RiEEF, JUDICIAL REFORM IN ILLINoIs 121-25
(1969). Howe, JP's under Fire, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 15, 1969, at 1.
64. Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies-an Historical Analysis, in
STUDiEs iN JuICuIA PoLITcs, TuLANE STumS i PoIarcAL ScirucE 45-6 (K.
Vines & H. Jacob eds. 1962); Jacob, supra note 24, at 139.
65. The Judiciary, supra note 52, at 103-04, 118.
66. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5 (1879).
67. Id. § 17.
68. Id. § 8; JUDICIAL CouNcm Or CALIFoRNIA, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND = LEGISLATURE 171 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Aw-
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over, during the last four years, no legislative efforts have been
made either to abolish these courts or to require such justices to be
licensed California attorneys. However, because of the lobbying
power wielded by such officers, this judicial position is likely to ex-
ist for at least a decade.69 In fact, if the post-1955 national trend
continues, the states will not terminate these offices or their judi-
cial functions before 1985.70
Finally, in the writer's view, the advantage of terminating such
offices is often undermined by engrafting some of their officers into
newly consolidated trial court systems. However, because of their
power as a pressure group, such a compromise may be an unavoid-
able price for eliminating such positions. For example, in 1964,
Illinois fee officers were allowed to become magistrates in the con-
solidated circuit courts and to hear minor criminal and civil cases.71
Nonetheless, the elimination of such former officers are now super-
vised by a chief judge in each circuit, who can replace them if he
and the circuit judges want to do so.
72
C. Judicial Leadership
1. Functions, Problems, and Powers
A third facet of judicial management is the exercise of leadership
by two line authorities: the chief justice at the state level and the
chief judges at the local level. Scholars have tended to focus most
of their attention on executive leadership in the public and private
sectors and have virtually ignored judicial leadership. 73 Only
within the last few years have researchers begun to delineate, al-
NUAL REPORT]; B. COOK, THE JuDIcLaIL PRocEss IN CALIFORNIA 58 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as COOK].
69. CooK, supra note 68, at 68-69.
70. This projection was calculated as follows: 15 years/25 states =
X/25 remaining states. X = 15 years. 1970 plus 15 = 1985.
71. ILL. CoNsT. art. VI § 4(e) (1870); LAws OF THE STATE OF ILL. ENACTED
ny THE 73RD GEN. ASSEMVBLY AT = REG. BIENNIAL SESs. pt. I, 1167-68 (1963).
72. ILL. CONsT. art. VI § 4(3) (1870); LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILL. ENACTED
y m 73RD GEN. ASSmMLY AT =u REG. BIENNIAL SEsS. pt. I, 1167-68 (1963).
73. See, e.g., C. BARNARD, THE FUNcTIONS OF THE EXEcuTIVE 216-17 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as BARNARD]; P. DRUCKER, THE EFFEcTIvE EXEcUTIVE
9-24 (1967); R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 22 (1964); L. SAYLES,
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR: ADMINISTRATION IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 33-45
(1964); Golembiewski, Three Styles of Leadership and Their Uses, 38 PER-
SONNEL 34-45 (1961).
beit impressionistically, some of the functions that such executives
carry out or should perform 74 and to recommend programs to train
such managers.75 Perhaps the main reason for this neglect is that,
until the states began to consolidate their judicial bureaucracies,
the multiplicity of independent trial courts made the opportunities
for such leadership rare. However, because of such consolidations,
judicial executives have been created at the supreme court and trial
court levels.76 These executives are beginning to operate judicial
organizations as if they were the same as other bureaucracies be-
cause the former are becoming increasingly analogous to the lat-
ter.77 The state supreme court is assuming the role of top manage-
ment with the chief justice as chairman of the board of justices and
with the court administrator's office as the staff arm of the board.
The appellate courts are beginning to resemble middle management.
The chief judges of the trial courts are starting to constitute super-
visory management over a labor force of judges, associate judges,
magistrates, clerks, attorneys, and litigants.78
In this new ambience both kinds of judicial executives have
started to confront the leadership functions, problems, and powers
that their counterparts in other public-as well as private-organi-
zations had exercised for many years. Like Barnard's industrial
executives, judicial leaders are beginning to perform such functions
as setting output goals, facilitating communications throughout the
judicial bureaucracy, motivating other justices and judges, and
serving as a power broker among competing factions.79 Moreover,
judicial executives face the broad range of managerial problems
that confront other corporate leaders-such as specializing effec-
tively; delegating authority wisely; maintaining unity of command;
narrowing the span of control; avoiding excessive layering; decid-
ing whether to establish and organize departments, divisions, or
districts on the basis of purpose, process, place, or clientele; using
their staff members advantageously; emphasizing the judicial
74. Gallas, The Profession of Court Management, 51 JUDICATURE 334-36
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Gallas].
75. Gallas, Create University-Trained Court Managers, 4 TReAu 21-22
(1968).
76. The Judiciary, supra note 65, at 103.
77. J. GALBRArT, THE NEW INDUSTRiAL STATE 159-68 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as GALBRaT]. See also, Pound, supra note 56, at 78; PasmE's
Comm'N, supra note 38, at 380; Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound
Judicial System, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 13 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Vander-
bilt].
78. JACOB, supra note 24, at 81-82, 139; Jares & Mendelsohn, The Judicial
Role and Sentencing Behavior, 11 MIDWEST 3. OF POL. ScI. 486-87 (1967);
KoNEsIi & Mr-,NPLSON, supra note 24, at 6.
79. BA ,NARD supra note 73, at 216-17.
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budget as an instrument of co-ordination, control, and planning;
measuring output; using computers for retrieving information, for
case scheduling, and for maintaining records; striking a balance
between the scientific management and the human relations ap-
proaches to the treatment of subordinates; and handling such
housekeeping operations as the recruitment, training, and super-
vision of clerks, secretaries, court reporters, and bailiffs.8 0 Finally,
judicial executives have gained some of the powers wielded by their
industrial counterparts-such as the power to transfer judicial per-
sonnel to divisions or districts where a backlog is forming or wors-
ening and the power to discipline judges for handling cases too
quickly, too slowly, or too incompetently by shifting them from one
section of the judicial bureaucracy to another.8 ' Even though such
executives cannot dismiss their elected line subordinates, they can
often force them to resign as a consequence of an adverse transfer,
temporary suspension, or unfavorable publicity resulting from in-
vestigations by their staff agency, the state or local court adminis-
trator's office.
During the last few years, at least three events point toward the
establishment of programs to train judicial leaders. First, Edward
C. Gallas (former Executive Officer of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County) suggested that all prospective trial court judges
and staff officials receive managerial training from one of three
possible sources: graduate-school programs in public administra-
tion, courses at the same level in business administration, or special
programs to be established by law schools. Such a curriculum
would include courses in fiscal administration, accounting, person-
nel management, organizational theory, data processing, and public
relations. Furthermore, such a program would apply to prospective
lawyers and judges seeking to be court managers rather than to
incumbent court officials or non-law aspiring to fill such mana-
gerial positions. His program implies an insularity of the law pro-
80. See e.g., BARNARD, supra note 73, at 119, 122; M. FOLLET, TE NEW
STATE 5 (1918); W. GrvEN, BOTTOM-UP MANAGEMENT: PEOPLE WORKING
TOGETER 3-4, 10-12 (1949); PAPERS ON THE SCIENCE OF ADMNISTRATION 1-45
(L. Gulik & L. Urwick eds. 1937); A. HERON, WHY MEN WORK 22, 61
(1948); SECTION ON JuDICAL DIIN., supra note 49, at 12-13; H. SIMON, AD-
iism TRATmn BEHAVioR 20-44 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as SnvIMON];
F. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OP SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 10 (1942). See also
notes 74 and 75 supra.
81. PRESmENT's CoMM'x, supra note 38, at 379-80.
fession against outsiders, which may make the former objectives
more feasible than the latter.
8 2
Second, in Chief Justice Burger's recent address to the American
Bar Association, he implicitly reinforced Gallas' proposal when he
commented: "The management of busy courts calls for careful
planning, definite systems organization, with supervision by trained
administrative-managers. ' 83 Third, the Institute of Court Manage-
ment at the University of Denver Law School was established
shortly after Burger's speech to devise a special training program
for judicial leaders.8 4 To the author's knowledge, this program is
unique. So far no California law schools, public universities, or col-
leges have considered following Gallas' or Burger's suggestions in
order to furnish managerial training to prospective and incumbent
presiding judges of the superior and municipal courts in this state.
Two reasons may account for this failure: the recentness of these
suggestions and reductions by the state legislature in the higher
educational budgets stemming, in part, from popular resentment of
campus disorders.8 5
C. Judicial Leadership
2. An Example of Judicial Leadership
One may cite at least two recent episodes to illustrate the overall
-but uneven-growth of judicial leadership at the state supreme
court and trial court levels:
In 1965 the Illinois General Assembly provided for the compulsory
retirement of all justices and judges at age seventy.80 However, it
was unclear whether this law also included magistrates. In early
August 1967, John S. Boyle (Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, a consolidated trial court) appointed three magis-
trates, two of whom were seventy and one who was seventy-one.8 7
On August 11, 1967, Chief Justice Roy J. Sofisburg, Jr. (exercising
82. See notes 74 and 75 supra.
83. See U.S. NEws, supra note 1, at 70.
84. This information was initially given to the author by Mr. Lawrence
Adams (Secretary of the Superior Court of San Diego County) on Sept. 10,
1970. See also M/fr. Geoffrey Gallas, Educational Consultant, the Institute
for Court Management, U. of Denver Law Center, Denver, Colo. 80204.
85. R. MYPFx, EDUCATION IN CIMIINAL JUSTICE 22, 25-26 (1970). See also
Greenwood, Full Impact of Budget Jolts State Colleges, Los Angeles Times,
July 29, 1970, at 1.
86. LAws OF THE STATE OF ILL. ENACTED BY THE 74vn GEN. AsSEMBLY AT
TIE REc. BIENNIAL SEss. 1965, pt. I, 1792 (1965).
87. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 11, 1967, § 1 at 1-2; Chicago's American,
Aug. 11, 1967, at 7.
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managerial authority over the entire state judiciary)8 8 ordered
Boyle to remove these men from their office and to replace them
with persons who had not reached the mandatory retirement age.
Sofisburg issued this order even though he publicly conceded that
there was no direct prohibition in the law against Boyle's action.8 9
However, the unity of command in the Illinois judicial bureauc-
racy, although substantial, is not absolute; for not only all subor-
dinates (except magistrates and staff officers) have the tenure of
elective office,0° but also all assignments of judges by the chief
justice have to be approved by the chief judge of the circuit to
which the assignments are made.9' Both restrictions illustrate the
delegation of judicial power which has been constitutionally built
into this bureaucracy. (See Figures 2 & 4.)
Because general review of judicial leadership in state trial courts
tends to remain abstract, one must complement such an analysis
with the examination of such leadership in a particular trial court
system. The one in Cook County, Illinois (which includes Chicago
and its suburbs), is worthy of study for three principal reasons.
First, this system is the nation's largest.92 Second, its deficiencies
are most acute and increasingly visibe. 93 Third, its difficulties fur-
nish a microcosmic view of some problems facing most other trial
court jurisdictions, although on an aggravated scale.94 However, be-
fore considering the Cook County system during peaceful and crisis
situations, one must first briefly describe its organization.
Since 1964 Cook County has had one trial court (a circuit court)
with exclusive, original jurisdiction. Before that time the County
had endured a maze of trial courts with overlapping jurisdictions.
Cases were often filed in several courts, depending on the backlogs
in each court and the probability of a favorable outcome to the
plaintiff. Since many courts were fee offices (justices of the peace,
police magistrates, and masters in chancery) where no records
88. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (1870).
89. See note 87 supra.
90. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11 (1870).
91. Id. § 2.
92. INSTITUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY-1969
STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, PERSONAL INJURY CASES vi-ix
[hereinafter cited as CALENDAR STUDY].
93. Id. at vi.
94. Id. at vi-ix.
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Source: Derived from Establish Justice: Annual Report of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, at 5-22 (1965).
were usually kept, many cases handled by such offices were often
retried in the county trial courts of record.0 5 The labyrinth of
trial courts, the fee offices, and a need for supervising the entire
state court system were the main reasons for consolidating the state
judiciary through a new judicial article in 1964.0
Under this article the state was divided into twenty circuits, each
of which was to be presided over by a chief judge who was to be
chosen by the circuit and associate judges9 7 and who was em-
95. Jenner, Saltz & Tone, Introduction, 2 SAUTH-HURD ILL. ANNO. STAT.
CONST. ART. VI-END 3-9 (1964).
96. ILL. CONsT. art. VI §§ 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 (1870).
97. Id. § 8. ESTABLISH JUSTICE: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
CooK COUNTY, ILIaNoIs 4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ESTABLISH JUSTICE].
Associate judges possess all the authority of circuit judges with two ex-
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powered to organize and manage that circuit. In Cook County,
Chief Judge John S. Boyle divided this circuit into seven divisions
and six districts. The divisions-chancery, county, criminal, divorce,
family, law, and probate-embraced Chicago whereas the districts
encompassed the rest of Cook County. Over each division he ap-
pointed a presiding judge. Such appointments were not necessary
for the districts mainly because the litigation in the suburbs was
substantially less than in the cities. For assistance in the manage-
ment of this circuit, Boyle appointed an attorney, Benjamin S.
Mackoff, as Administrative Director.
9 8
Despite the new Illinois judicial article, the normal, peaceful sit-
uation in this circuit has been one of persistent congestion, espe-
cially in the law division, which handles personal-injury cases.
This civil congestion leads to delay in the disposition of criminal
cases because, as more judges are assigned to the law division, fewer
judges remain to hear criminal cases. Since 1964 the delay in the
handling of law-division cases has declined from 62.4 months to 61.3
months as of March, 1970 (the latest month for which this informa-
tion is available).99
At this rate of decline the backlog of such cases will not be
eliminated before the year 2304.100 For litigants the situation is
undoubtedly one of rising frustration, synicism, and disrespect for
this trial court system.
The responsibility for this situation is scattered. Boyle has tried
to alleviate the congestion. Between 1964 and 1967 he lengthened
the work year of judges, instituted a central case assignment sys-
tem to reduce delay caused by the calendar system, which requires
that cases be heard according to the order of filing, eliminated
the professional bondsmen and their exorbitant fees, conducted
extensive pre-trial programs, began summer jury trials, and com-
ceptions: Associate judges cannot participate in the appointment of
magistrates or in the formulation of circuit court rules.
98. ESTABiaSH JusicE, supra note 97, at 4-22.
99. Anm nasTRU TvE OFrnc. oF THE ILinzOiS COURTS: 1964 AIINUAL REPORT
TO TIM SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOiS 43, 45 (1965); CALEwAR STUDY supra
note 92, at vi; Chicago Daily News, June 4, 1970, at 1.
100. This prediction was reached by the following calculations: 1.1
months decline during 6 year period was divided into 61.3 months. The
resulting number 55.7 was multiplied by 6 years and yielded 334.2 years.
1970 plus 334.2 equals 2304.
puterized the record-keeping of the Court.1 0 '
Moreover, in late 1967 Boyle temporarily suspended two associate
judges-one for setting a large number of unusually low bonds for
persons charged with felonies, the other for setting an extraor-
dinarily high number of bonds. The resulting adverse publicity
induced both men to resign.
02
Furthermore, in 1970, pressure from the Chicago Bar Association,
the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts, and adverse newspaper
publicity induced him to announce additional devices for allevi-
ating this congestion: the empowering of Circuit Court magistrates
to hear personal injury claims up to $15,000, superseding the pre-
vious $10,000 limit; the authority of magistrates to hear uncon-
tested divorce claims; mandatory negotiations by attorneys to settle
potential lawsuits; the establishment of a pre-trial section in the
law division to narrow, accelerate, or eliminate cases; the placement
of new judges in this division; the assignment of five judges to
hear cases filed by attorneys who are handling fewer than ten
cases at a time in this division; and the assignment of more Down-
state judges to this circuit to maintain a minimum of thirty-eight
judges in this division.
0 3
However, he has tolerated many instances of judicial indolence.
In 1967 a nationally respected journalist, Howard James, found evi-
dence of such laxity and commented:
In Chicago, the city with the biggest backlog, this reporter has
checked all 114 courtrooms in the new Civic Center several times.
On a typical day he found judges on the bench in only 11 of the
114 courtrooms between 9:30 and 10 A.M.; 58 of the 114 benches
filed between 10 A.IVL and 10:30 A.M.; 45 judges sitting between
10:30 and 11 A.M.; and the same number between 11 and 11:30
A.M. Between 2:30 and 3 P.M. there were only 34 of the 114
benches with judges sitting.104
Between August 9 and 16, 1969, in the Chicago Civic Center, the
author of this article also saw numerous courtrooms (from floors
thirteen to twenty-six) that were vacant in the morning and in the
afternoon. Boyle has allegedly failed to set a stringent policy on the
granting of continuances. From the Administrative Office of Illinois
101. Interview with Chief Judge John S. Boyle, Aug. 9, 1969 and Benja-
min S. Mackoff, Administrative Director, Aug. 16, 1969, both in Chicago.
102. Chicago Tribune, May 12, 1967, § I at 1; Chicago Tribune, Sept. 15,
1967, § 1 at 1; Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1967, § 1, at 1; Chicago Sun
Times, Nov. 21, 1967, at 8.
103. Green, Court Changes on the Way, Chicago Daily News, May 27,
1970, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Green]; Chicago Today, June 26, 1970, at 5;
Suburban Economist (Chicago), July 1, 1970, at 8.
104. H. JAMEs, CIsIs IN HE COURTS 25 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
JAMES].
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Courts, the author ascertained that some circuit judges, such as
Albert E. Hallett, routinely grant at least three continuances without
question, if requested. Boyle has not, as far as the author could
discover, attempted to persuade his presiding judges into taking
backlog-reducing steps, perhaps because they have been his life-
long friends and had been independent trial judges for many
years.
105
However, since 1968 he has required the judges of this court to
submit weekly reports of their case dispositions to his administra-
tive director. These reports have been collated into quarterly and
yearly reports but have not been made public.10 6 Although such
record-keeping may furnish Boyle with a basis for disciplining in-
dolent judges, there is no public indication that he has tried such
action. In fact, the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts recently
found that three judges of the thirty in the law division (10 per-
cent) have been hearing approximately one-fourth of all the cases
-a highly uneven work-load distribution. 0 7
Others share responsibility with Boyle. The Illinois General As-
sembly has not provided for enough judges. The state and city bar
associations have not turned out a sufficient number of trial law-
yers. Many litigants have filed frivolous suits and have demanded
jury rather than bench trials. Numerous law firms have accepted
far more cases than they can realistically handle. The backlog itself
has perpetuated expectations of delay by all the parties to pending
cases. Consequently, the congestion in this circuit, especially in its
law division, has remained intractable.
Moreover, the mode of recruiting circuit judges has raised a se-
rious question about the quality as well as the quantity of decisions.
A nexus is widely believed to exist between judicial positions in this
circuit and the Democratic Party; for most judges have allegedly
gained their positions as a result of patronage, a reward for their
party loyalty rather than for their putative legal abilities. 108 Fur-
thermore, this mode of recruitment virtually assures an aging,
provincial judiciary. The typical member of this circuit court is
105. ESTA3LISH JiusTIcE, supra note 97, at 4-22.
106. Chicago Today, June 4, 1970, at 3.
107. Green, supra note 103, at 1, 12.
108. Karaganis, Who's on the Bench?, Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 7, 1969,
§ 2 at 1.
sixty-four, was born in Chicago, attended a local law school (espe-
cially the DePaul College of Law), privately practiced for several
years, worked for one of three public offices (state's attorney,
U.S. attorney, or corporation counsel for the city), served as a
Democratic party official, is Catholic, and is Irish, Italian, or Polish
in most instances. 10 9 In addition, since many of these judges come
from middle-class backgrounds, they may display certain ideological
proclivities in their decisions: anti-civil libertarianism, hostility to
minority groups, political conservatism, although they may be lib-
eral in labor-union cases. However, there is no published study
centering on the qualitative or ideological propensities of these
judges.
Because this trial court functions poorly-qualitatively and quan-
titatively-during peaceful times, it is understandable that its per-
formance, according to the Skolnick Report,1 10 worsened during
periods of turmoil. For example, during the rioting in Chicago after
the death of Martin Luther King, the daily caseload in this circuit
increased tenfold without any comparable increase in emergency
personnel. Many arrestees were not permitted to telephone their
families on the alleged ground that the security risk would be ex-
cessive. Bails were unusually set so high that they amounted to
preventive detention. Legal representation was scarce, and due
process became a casualty of the disorder. However, criticism from
Chicago's Negro bar association helped to prompt this circuit court
to conduct bail hearings."'
Boyle and his colleagues have not adopted the recommendation of
the Kerner Commission that trial courts, including the Circuit Court
of Cook County, plan alternatives to an unconditional release or a
high bail. Such alternatives might include release to third parties
outside the riot area, supervision by civic organizations, and release
on one's own recognizance. 1"2 However, the last mode of release
was limited to accused curfew violators; and the gravity of the alle-
gation tended, in most cases, to determine how high the bail would
be. The judges in this circuit allegedly paid little attention to the
defendant's background, especially his arrest record, if any. Finally,
109. Chicago Daily News, June 3, 1970, § 1 at 3. These conclusions were
ultimately derived from biographical data on the judges found in the fol-
lowing four sources: EsTABLISH JusTicE, supra note 97, at 5-22; 2 M1RTix-
DALE HUBBEL LAw DIRECTORY 1969, LAwYERs: ILLINOIS-Mt.ISsOURI; WHO'S
WHo n AMERiCA 1968-1969; and WHo's WHO IN THE MIDWEST (10th ed.
1966).
110. SxOLmcm , supra note 35, at 313-16.
111. Id. at 314.
112. NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 36, at 341-44.
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this circuit court tended to operate as an adjunct of the Mayor's
office and city prosecutors rather than as an independent force
to insure that they often operate lawfully, especially during tur-
moil.113 However, since many judges in this circuit have been
Mayor Richard J. Daley's political associates for a few decades, such
institutional interlocking has resulted.
D. Court Congestion (or Delay): A Central Leadership Problem
A fourth facet of judicial management is court congestion, which,
although technically a part of judicial leadership, is extensive
enough to be considered separately. Even though judicial execu-
tives perform numerous significant functions, perhaps their central
task is to regulate the caseload of a court. In most trial courts this
regulation becomes a problem of reducing delay.
There are at least seven common definitions of trial court delay.
One definition equates delay with backlog size.114 However, Zeisel
and his colleagues have castigated this formulation in the following
words:
[T]he cardinal fact about the disposition of cases in our courts is
that only a fraction of the suits reach the trial stage, and it is only
at this stage that they become a serious burden on the court. This
is why the size of the backlog is so frequently a paper figure of
limited significance. The numerical size of the backlog tells us
little unless we also know the size of the court, the proportion of
cases settled before assignment, and the time it takes to dispose
of assigned cases. A large backlog of pending suits may be dis-
posed of quite speedily if the court is large, or if the average time
required for disposition is small, or if a large proportion of cases
is disposed of voluntarily without court action. And since any or
all of these factors may change over time, the nominal backlog is
a poor measure of delay even within the same court system. The
backlog may decrease even while the delay increases. 115
A second definition identifies delay with the age of the last case
scheduled to be tried in regular order. However, this formulation
is defective because the proportion of cases where trial courts
grant preference or permit litigants to defer their cases varies
greatly among and within jurisdictions over a long span of time." 6
113. SKoLwicK, supra note 35, at 313-16.
114. H. ZEIsEL, H. KALVEN, JR., & B. BucHHoLz, DELAY nf Tm CouRTs 43,
45 (1959) [hereinafter cited as ZEIsEL, KALvEN & BUCHHOLZ].
115. Id. at 44.
116. Id. at 45.
A third definition regards delay as the average interval between
the filing of an action and the trial."" A fourth definition (a
slight variant of the third) equates delay with the average time
period between answer and trial.118 Both formulations contain the
same alleged flaw as the first definition. A fifth meaning of delay
treats it as the average time lapse between the point when a case
is at issue and the trial."" Under this formulation court delay, as
measured in months, appears to be far less substantial than it does
under previous definitions. Nonetheless, the fourth and fifth mean-
ings are used by the Institute of Judicial Administration in gathering
congestion statistics from the many trial courts across the nation.
120
A sixth definition is simply the average age of all cases reaching
trial, regardless of whether the order is regular or preferred.121
This formulation synthesizes the two previous definitions. A sev-
enth meaning of delay is the average time between the original
filing and the termination of appeal proceedings, if any.122 This
definition embraces relatively few cases but does imply that delay
measurement is a far broader concept than scholars have generally
regarded it.
Although these definitions of trial court delay apply to civil liti-
gation, one might devise similar definitions for criminal cases-such
as the average time between arrest and arraignment, arrest to trial
(if any), arraignment to trial (if any), trial to sentencing, and
arrest to final appeal. Delay in civil and criminal cases is inextric-
ably linked to each other because the more judges that trial courts
have committed to civil litigation, the fewer judges there are to
handle criminal cases.' 23 The converse of this statement is also
valid. However, trial court delay is a malady more generally af-
fecting civil rather than criminal litigation for at least two principal
reasons. First, in the latter, as Dean Barrett notes, "Constitutional
guarantees of 'speedy trial,' and statutory time limits require rela-
tively speedy handling.' 2 4 In California, as in most other states,
the trial-date period is sixty days. 2 Second, the overwhelming
number of criminal cases end at arraignment with a plea of guilty
117. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Rem-
edies, in THE CouRTs, supra note 28, at 32.
118. CALENDAR STUDY, supra note 92, at ii-iii.
119. Id.; Green, The Situation in 1959, 328 ANNALS 7 (1960).
120. CALENDAR STUDY, supra note 92, at ii-iii, vi, 4.
121. ZEIsEL, KALvEx, & BucmxoLz, supra note 114, at 43, 45.
122. Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 32.
123. JArVEs, supra note 104, at 22.
124. THE CouRTs, supra note 25, at 106.
125. CAL. PErNA CODE § 1382 (2) (West 1970).
State Trial Courts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
to a lesser charge.12 6 Therefore, since civil delay has so far been
more critical than the congestion in the criminal area, let us focus
our attention on the civil half of the delay issue.
Because thirty-five states have court administrator's offices to
gather statistics 127 and because such information has been funneled
since 1953 into the Institute of Judicial Administration 28 for colla-
tion into a national picture of trial court delay, one may readily
ascertain the current seriousness of this problem. Overall, court
congestion varies directly with population. If one accepts the fourth
definition of delay, which is the most common, one may easily per-
ceive this direct variation. (See Figure 5.) For counties with a
population over 750,000, the Circuit Court of Cook County faces the
worst congestion with an average delay of 59.6 months. The official
population of this county in 1960 was 5,129,725. Nationally, Los
Angeles County, the most populated in California, ranked four-
teenth in congestion with an average delay of 35.9 months. 29 Its
official 1960 population was 16,038,771. By contrast, the Circuit
Court of Dade County, Florida, ranked last with an average delay of
9.7 months. However, the population of this county in 1960 was
only 935,047. For counties with populations between 500,000 and
750,000, the Supreme Court of Suffolk County, New York, has ex-
perienced the most congestion with an average delay of 47.3
months whereas the Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, faces a nominal delay-an average of only 4.2
months. The population of both counties is nearly the same-666,784
and 553,154, respectively, as of 1960. Nationally, San Francisco
County, (third in California population with 742,855 as of 1960)
ranked seventeenth in congestion with an average delay of 30.7
months. 30 By contrast, San Diego County, (second in California
population with 1,033,011 as of 1960) was unranked among the na-
tionwide counties most beset with civil delay.' 3 ' Finally, for coun-
ties with populations under 500,000, the worst average delay-30.6
months-belongs to the superior Court of Hillsborough County, New
126. THE CouRTs, supra note 25, at 110-11; CRIME AND LEGAL PROCESS
207-08 (W. Chambliss ed. 1969).
127. The Judiciary, supra note 52, at 118.
128. CALnmAR STDy, supra note 92, at 1.
129. Id. at vii.
130. Id.
131. Id. at vi-ix.
Hampshire. The population of this county in 1960 was 178,161. By
contrast, numerous counties in this category encountered only neg-




A National View (1969)
Average Time
in Months from Range in
County Population Answer to Trial Months
Over 750,000 32.2 9.7-59.6
Between 500,000
and 750,000 21.0 4.2-47.3
Under 500,000 13.0 2.4-30.6
Source: Basen on INsTITuTE Or JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS
STUDY-1969. STATE TRIAL CoURTs OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.
PERSONAL INJURY CASES, AUGUST 1, 1969, at vi.
Because trial court congestion has been a serious problem for
many years, proposed solutions-drastic and mild-have abounded.
The numerous suggestions ultimately seek to make the operations
of trial courts considerably more just. 3 8 More specifically, these
proposals contain at least four implicitly normative premises. First,
if implemented, the measures should not materially increase the
probability of different outcomes in cases. Second, the proposals
should be simple and inexpensive, compared with the time and
money savings effected. Third, the measures should be straight-
forward. Finally, the changes should stress fairness and good faith
to the litigants.134 However, to achieve these goals, a judge, as one
prominent law professor has commented, "must be politician, ad-
ministrator, bureaucrat, and lawyer in order to cope with a crush-
ing calendar of cases.'
1 35
Among the most widely advocated proposals for reducing trial
court delay are the following: the abolition of jury trials gener-
ally, the elimination of such trials in personal-injury cases, induce-
ments to increase jury-trial waivers (such as by using a compara-
tive rather than contributory negligence rule in exchange for this
132. Id. at vi-ix. For the method adopted by the Judicial Council of
California to measure delay in its Superior Courts, see 1967 ANNUAL REPoRT,
supra note 68, at 184-87.
133. Rosenberg, Foreward in WALTER E. MEYR INSTITUTE OF LAW, DOL-
LARS, DELAY Am) T E AUTOMOBILE VICTIM iv (1968).
134. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and Proposed Reme-
dies, in TkE CoURTS, supra note 25, at 58.
135. A. BLUmiBEG, CRIvMNAL JUSTICE 122-23 (1967).
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waiver), the acceleration of jury trials (such as by a judge's assum-
ing more vigorous charge of it, participating in the questioning of
witnesses, curtailing repetitive testimony, discouraging perfunctory
objections), devices to increase settlements (such as pre-trial con-
ferences, impartial medical experts, certificates of readiness for trial
before docketing cases, and the payment of interest by losing de-
fendants to encompass the time from accident to verdict), the re-
duction of trial-scheduling gaps (such as by changing the system of
handling cases from a calendar to an assignment basis), stringent
supervision by presiding judges, weekly public reports on individ-
ual judicial output, more court days, summer sessions, longer hours
per court day, an enlarged trial bar, more judges, a leveled court
calendar (whereby delay is more equitably distributed by refusing
to accord preference to certain kinds of cases), split trials (the sep-
aration of liability and damage proceedings), compulsory arbitra-
tion of small claims, the use of auditors (references to supplement
judges), and automobile-accident compensation plans (modeled
after workman's compensation programs).136 However, apart from
the limited works of Hans Zeisel and Maurice Rosenberg,18 7 there
136. These proposed antidotes for trial court delay have been culled from
numerous sources: JACOB, supra note 24, at 82-83; M. ROSENBERG, THE PRE-
TRIAL CONFM;ENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE 87 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
ROSENBERG]; ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUCHEOLz, supra note 114, at 43-217; Botein,
Impartial Medical Testimony, 328 ANNALs 75-83 (1960); Hofstadter, A Pro-
posed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 328 AxN~ALs 53-60 (1960);
Kalven, The Bar, the Court, and the Delay, 328 ANNALS 37-45 (1960);
Miner, Court Congestion: a New Approach, 45 A.B.A.J. 1265-68 (1959);
Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: a "Before and After"
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89-112 (1959), reprinted in 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 457-81
(1964); Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Reme-
dies, in THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 32-58; Rosenberg & Chanin, Auditors
in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed Civil Courts, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
27-56 (1961); Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitra-
tion of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REv. 448-72 (1961);
Rosenberg & Schubin, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation,
59 COLum. L. REv. 1115-70 (1959); Zeisel, Court Delay Caused by the Bar?,
54 A.B.A.J. 886-88 (1968); Zeisel, Delay by the Parties and Delay by the
Courts, 15 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 27-33 (1962); Zeisel, Splitting Liability and
Damage Issue Saves 20% of Court's Time, 351 A.B.A. SECTION ON INSUR-
ANcE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAw 322-24 (1963); Zeisel & Callahan,
Split-Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1606-25 (1963); Zeisel & Kalven, Delay in the Court: A Summary View,
15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 104-18 (1960). For recent symposia exploring the
delay facet, see note 28 supra.
137. See note 136 supra, especially ZEISEL, KALVEN & BUEHOLZ, supra note
114 at 43-217; and ROSENBERG, supra note 136 at 89-112.
have been no empirical studies assessing the operational merits of
these proposals.
Although Rosenberg found the comparative negligence rule to be
an effective delay-cutting method in the Arkansas trial courts, 188
only Zeisel, and his colleagues have systematically tested the utility
of the above-mentioned devices in a large-city trial court system.
Examining the records of the Supreme Court of New York County
(Manhattan), the Zeisel staff discovered that these proposals varied
substantially in congestion-reducing value. For instance, his staff
ascertained the following average results in three categories of de-
vices:
1) Proposals to reduce trial time: Split trials saved twenty
percent of the Court's trial time. Jury trials run forty percent
longer than bench trials. The abolition of jury trials in personal-in-
jury cases saved thirty-two percent in Court time.
2) Proposals to increase settlements: Increasing jury waivers
result in only a marginal time reduction. Judicial interventions to
accelerate trials effected a chronological reduction between thirty-
five and forty-one percent. Devices to increase the probability of
settlements achieved a time reduction of only two percent. The
use of impartial medical witnesses by the Court raised the pre-trial
settlement of cases by six percent. The payment of interest by los-
ing defendants from the day of the accident rather than the day of
the award effected a slight increase in court delay. Pre-trial confer-
ences are justified only if at least twenty-five percent of the cases
handled in this manner would have otherwise reached the trial
stage. Certificates of readiness had no apparent effect on the time
needed to try personal-injury cases, but when applied to commer-
cial cases did reduce the latter so that more of the former could be
tried.
3) Proposals to increase judge time: Between 196 and 207
trial days are available to the Court each year. The trial days per
judge for each year was 170. Summer Court sessions are ineffective
because of the tradition that the bench and the bar vacation dur-
ing this season. Judges worked 4.1 hours per day, but the Zeisel
staff could not determine whether this figure derived from personal
factors or scheduling difficulties. A comparison of the assignment
and calendar systems was indeterminate. Denying continuances to
lawyers would force them to take one of three possible actions: go
to trial, relinquish cases to other lawyers, or add more trial attor-
neys to their firms. Leveling the Court calendar effected a twenty
138. ROSENBERG, supra note 136, at 89-112.
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percent time savings. Finally, if more judges were not added to the
Court, three other remedies would be effective: the centralized
management of the judicial system; shifts in judges from less-to-
more congested tribunals; and the extensive use of surrogate judges
-masters, referees, and auditors-who have helped to alleviate
court delay in Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, re-
spectively.
13 9
In California, scholars have surveyed the applicability of such
proposals only in one large county: San Diego County. In this
county the author found that, according to most Superior and Mu-
nicipal Court judges, the civil and criminal congestion in their or-
ganization was not yet sufficiently serious to warrant their adoption
of most of the above suggestions. Their general attitude was that
the various devices listed for accelerating jury trials, the several
methods enumerated for increasing settlements, the assignment
system, pre-trial conference, stringent supervision by presiding
judges, and more judges would suffice to prevent both kinds of liti-
gation from becomi'ng unmanageable in their courts. However,
some Municipal Court judges disclosed that the conversion of some
felonies into misdemeanors was beginningto transfer an excessive
number of cases from the Superior Court of this county to the
Downtown Municipal Court. Finally, except for two Superior Court
judges, no judges in either Court favored total consolidation of Cali-
fornia's three kinds of trial courts into a single trial court with ex-
clusive, comprehensive, original jurisdiction within each county.
Nor, with these exceptions, did they favor the absorption of Mu-
nicipal and Justice Court functions by Superior Courts.
140
E. Judicial Staffs: Competitors for Leadership?
A fifth facet of judicial management is the role of staffs as facil-
itators of-and as competitors for-judicial leadership. Staffs (com-
monly called court administrator's offices) were created to facilitate
such management. Such offices were established by constitutional
provisions or by legislation to furnish the judicial bureaucracy with
139. ZEISEL, KALVEN, & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 114, at 51-52, 85, 89, 98-99,
108, 119, 124, 128, 140, 151, 154, 166-67, 174, 180, 193, 198, 202, 209.
140. These preliminary findings rest on a random sample of Superior
Court and Municipal Court judges that the author interviewed in May-
June, 1970. The full analysis of this survey has not yet been completed.
the expertise that other large organizations, public and private,
had found necessary because of their growth.
141
Such staffs perform numerous functions that are prerequisites
for efficient judicial leadership, whether exercised mainly by line
or staff. The duties entrusted to such offices include evaluating
the organization, practices, and procedures of the state courts; keep-
ing records and compiling data on the cases handled by all state
courts; preparing periodic reports on the disposition of cases by all
such courts; making recommendations about the assignment of judg-
es to backlog-ridden courts; preparing and submitting estimates of
future judicial expenditures to the proper budgetary agency of the
state government; publishing and distributing copies of rules and
orders to judges and clerks; supervising clerical personnel and
their work; and securing the facilities and equipment needed by
the courts. The functions performed by such officers help to pro-
vide the information necessary for the unified direction of the en-
tire state judicial bureaucracy by the state supreme court (or its
chief justice) and for the improved supervision of the consolidated
trial courts by each chief judge.142 However, the operation of such
staffs at the trial court level may furnish chief judges with the
information needed to resist the overall direction of the state court
system by the staff agency of the highest state court (or its chief
justice).
According to the eminent jurist, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the num-
erous staff duties have enabled judicial executives to compare the
output of all judges; to determine whether a judge's work falls
above or below the mean for his court, division, or district; to assign
judges where they are most or least needed and where their
specialized abilities can be most effectively used; and to accelerate
the output of all trial courts.143  Although Vanderbilt implies a
high positive correlation between an increased quantity of judicial
decisions and their quality, 44 one is skeptical; for speedy decisions
are not necessarily wise or fair.
The states have witnessed a rapid increase in the number of court
administrator's offices created at the supreme court and trial court
levels. These offices have so far been established at one level or the
other in thirty-five states. In all but three states these offices have
141. The Judiciary, supra note 65, at 103; GAmLTuH, supra note 77, at
159-68, 176-88.
142. AmmcACA JUDIcATURE SOcIETY, CoURT AD sTRAToRs: THm FUc-
TIONS, QUALICATIONS AwD SALARIES, AJS INFoRmAON SHEET No, 34, July
1966, at 2-4 [hereinafter cited as CoURT ADmuISTRATORs].
143. Vanderbilt, supra note 77, at 13-14.
144. Id. at 8.
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been founded since 1948.145 (See Figure 3.) One of these three
states was California whose Judicial Council, in 1961, established
such a staff agency to recommend and implement Council poli-
cies. 4 6 If the trend of the last fifteen years continues, all states
will have such agencies by 1985.147
Although Vanderbilt viewed these staff officials as specialists
who augmented the managerial effectiveness of judicial execu-
tives,148 this assessment may no longer be valid. Such officials
may have become staff competitors for judicial leadership nomi-
nally exercised by the two primary line officials: the chief justice
and the chief judge. Such staff officials may be slowly forming
what, according to economist John Kenneth Galbraith, is a "techno-
structure"'49-a body of experts whose knowledge makes their titu-
lar superiors in the hierarchy dependent on them and hence sub-
ordinate to them in fact.150  He stresses that technostructures arise
in all large public and corporate organizations because the special-
ized knowledge needed to run them successfully varies directly
with their size.151
Because court administrators are experts, they may be gaining
de facto control of state judicial bureaucracies just as the techno-
structures dominate other organizations. Chief justices and chief
judges may be experiencing what their counterparts in other bu-
racracies have encountered: a widening gulf between their au-
thority and their power.'5 2 Such judicial executives may become
increasingly like corporation presidents who find themselves simply
ratifying decisions reached in the lower echelons by experts or strik-
ing compromises when the experts disagree among themselves. 58
145. The Judiciary, supra note 65, at 118.
146. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1879). See also THE CAiFmONIA BLuE
BOOK 25 (1969).
147. This projection was calculated as follows: 15 years/25 states -
X/25 remaining states. X = 15, 1970 plus 15 = 1985.
148. Vanderbilt, supra note 77, at 13-14.
149. GALBRATU, supra note 77, at 71.
150. Id. at 71-82.
151. Id. at 81-82.
152. V. THomvn'soN, MoDEm ORGAN= OiON 4-6 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as THOMPSON].
153. GALBRAITH, supra note 77, at 100-03. For an example of a company
president (Henry Ford) who refused to accept relegation to a titular role,
see EDITORS OF FORTUNE, THE ExECUTIVE LIFn 192 (1956); J. GALBRAITH, TE
IaRAL Houx 141-44 (1960); Harris, Ford's Fight for First, 50 FORTUNE 1-23,
Judicial executives may become relegated to this figurehead posi-
tion because they need the specialized knowledge of their staff
officials for intelligent policy-making and because these officials
determine the range of decisional choices open to such executives.
Thus court administrators may be acquiring more line functions,
may be reversing the downward flow of authority, may be provid-
ing judicial leadership themselves instead of merely facilitating it
for their titular superiors, may be assuming more significant deci-
sion-making, and may be turning into enclaves accountable in fact
to no one but themselves. Such changes may be the inevitable con-
comitants of organizational growth rather than a conscious con-
spiracy by a power elite.154 In the author's view such changes may
bring corporate efficiency to judicial organizations, but the state
trial courts may be removed even further from popular control.
However, since these organizations have long operated with con-
siderable insulation from public pressure, the price of further re-
moval is small for increased efficiency. So far legal scholars have
not adduced behavioral evidence to support the hypothesis that
court administrators have begun to assume de facto leadership of
judicial bureaucracies and to relegate the formal judicial executives
to a nominal role.
F. Judicial Selection and Tenure: Quality in Management
Because judicial management usually focuses on the operational
efficiency of courts,155 one may doubt whether subjects-such as
judicial selection and tenure as well as judicial discipline, removal,
and retirement-fall within the ambit of this field. However, these
topics are germane if one posits, as Vanderbilt does, "a fundamental
relation between the quality of judges and the proper administra-
tion of justice."'156 On this basis these subjects constitute facets of
judicial management and warrant at least brief review.
As a sixth facet of judicial management, judicial selection and
tenure entails consideration of three kinds of personnel for judicial
organizations: chief judges, judges, and staffs. (See Figure 4.) A
chief judge of a trial court wields broad managerial powers-such
as establishing such departments, divisions, or districts that he
deems desirable; the supervision of the entire trial court; the dele-
126 (Sept. 1954); Roberts, Ford's Reorganization: The Management Story,
19 ADv. MGv' T 912 (1954).
154. GALBPAITH, supra note 77, at 81-82. See also C. MILLS, THE PowaR
ELITE 3-4, 228-31 (1956); A. ROSE, THE PowER STRucTURE: PoITIcAL PRocEss
in Assr cAu SocIEr 41-42 (1967).
155. Vanderbilt, supra note 77, at 13; Gaflas, supra note 74, at 334-36.
156. A. VANDERIT, supra note 49, at 3.
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gation of managerial authority to subordinates such as presiding
judges for each division; preparation and execution of a budget;
maintenance of adequate courtrooms, chambers, and office facili-
ties; the initiation of studies pertaining to court business and man-
agement; the collection, compilation, and analysis of statistical
data about the operations of the court; and liaison between the
court and the various local governments, police officials, bar asso-
ciations, and civic groups.
157
Although this enumeration of managerial duties implies that a
chief judge is a powerful administrator, the selection system may
not necessarily assure this power and may create a divergence be-
tween his authority (his right to give orders to subordinates) and
his power (his ability to do so).158 For example, Illinois is a case
in point. Under its new judicial article, the judges and associate
judges of each circuit are authorized to select one of their members
to serve at their pleasure as chief judge, who will exercise general
managerial authority over the circuit court.1 59 However, this selec-
tion system may render a chief judge virtually powerless because,
as a consequence of his dependence on his colleagues for his posi-
tion, he cannot carry out state supreme court rules or his own rules
opposed by his colleagues without running the risk that they might
replace him. This selection system undercuts not only his power
but also the ability of the state supreme court to manage the entire
judicial organization. Nevertheless, a chief judge may narrow the
gap between his authority and his power by his interpersonal skills
and by the indifference of his colleagues.
Because chief judges are also judges, one must turn to the modes
of selecting the latter. The various selection systems have ranged
along a continuum from a totally elective system at one end to a
wholly appointive system at the other. 60 (See Figure 6.) Nine
157. ESTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 97, at 3.
158. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOM€IC ORGANIZATION 152
(A. Henderson & T. Parsons transl. 1947); THOMPSON, supra note 152, at
4-6; J. P=iwER & F. SHERWOOD, ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 77 (1960).
159. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (1870); ESTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 157, at
3. Associate judges possess all the authority of circuit judges with two ex-
ceptions: First, associate judges cannot participate in the appointment of
magistrates. Second, associate judges cannot participate in the formation
of circuit court rules.
160. The Judiciary, supra note 52, at 110-11.
states have adopted a compromise between these two poles: the
Kales plan. 1" (See Figure 6.) Under it a non-partisan commission
of lawyers, judges, and laymen submits to the governor a list of
names from which he is to fill court vacancies. Judges selected in
this manner are periodically required to seek subsequent popular
election to their positions. However, in such elections, incumbent
judges may not run without opposition. The only issue for the
voters to decide is whether an incumbent judge should be retained
in office. If such a judge is not retained, the governor is required
to appoint a replacement from the commission's list.
0 2
This system tries to apply an important tenet of traditional pub-
lic administration (the politics-administration dichotomy) to judi-
cial organizations as much as possible.163 However, this plan may
simply replace partisan politics with commission politics. At most,
only a partial separation of such organizations from partisan pres-
sures is possible. In analyzing this prospect, Stuart S. Nagel
wrote:
Regardless of judicial tenure and modes of selection, there will al-
ways be a residue of party-correlated judicial subjectivity so long
as political parties are at least value-oriented and so long as court
cases involve value-oriented controversies. Ultimately the prob-
lem becomes not how to remove this irreducible residue of judicial
subjectivity, but rather what direction it [should] take.10 4
Most states employ different modes of judicial selection at dif-
ferent levels of the state court system. Consequently, in twenty
states, there are two methods of judicial selection. Five states have
relied on three modes of judicial selection. All together, the fifty
states have employed, wholly or partly, different combinations of
the following five systems: partisan elections in thirty states, ap-
pointment in twenty-nine states, non-partisan elections in nineteen
states, the Kales plan in nine states, and legislative elections in
five states.'0 5 (See Figure 6.) Of these five modes of judicial selec-
161. A. KALES, UNopuLA GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATEs 245-47
(1914) [hereinafter cited as KALES]. The Kales plan of judicial selection
and tenure is commonly known by at least three other names: The Ameri-
can Bar Association plan, the American Judicature Society plan, and the
hybrid plan. See also, Reports of the Section on Judicial Administration,
63 ANmuAL REiT. oF THE A.B.A. 516-615 (1938); and Peltason, The Missouri
Plan for the Selection of Judges, in 20 THE UvEmTY or MIssouRI S.utwns
(No. 2, 1945).
162. See, e.g., Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 29(d) (1875) as amended (1940); Mo.
CoNsT. art. V, § 29(d) (1945).
163. Long, Power and Administration, 9 PuB. ADrmI. Ray. 257-64 (1949);
SIMON, supra note 80, at 45-60; Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administra-
tion, reprinted in 16 POL. ScI. Q. 494-95 (1941).
164. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am.
POL. SCL R.v. 850 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Nagel].
165. The Judiciary, supra note 52, at 110-11.
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tion, partisan elections and appointment are the oldest whereas the
Kales plan is the newest.166 If the states continue to adopt the Kales
plan at the slow pace of the last decade, this method will not oper-
ate in the remaining states before the year 2052.167
Figure 6
Judicial Selection Modes in the States (1969)
Election
Non- by State Ap-
Partisan Partisan Legis- Kales' point-
Year Elections Elections latures Plan ment
Before
1900 13 7 3 0 7
1900-1909 3 0 1 0 2
1910-1919 3 2 0 0 1
1920-1929 0 0 0 0 0
1930-1939 0 1 0 1 0
1940-1949 2 1 0 1 4
1950-1959 3 3 1 2 2
1960-1969 6 5 0 5 13
Total
States 30 19 5 9 29
Source: Derived from THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNnE STATES: NA-
TIONAL AND STATE (Cum. Supp. 1967).
Since 1934 California has employed a variation of the Kales plan
at the final and intermediate appellate court levels. The selection
and tenure system in this state provides for gubernatorial appoint-
ments to fill such vacancies. 68 At both levels non-partisan elec-
tions operate.169 However, the California system differs from the
Kales plan in two respects: First, whereas the latter provides for
a commission of judges, lawyers and laymen to nominate eligible
judges, the former has a commission to confirm or veto guberna-
torial choices: the Commission on Judicial Appointments, consist-
166. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE, Cu-
muLATiVE SuPPLEmENTs (1967).
167. This projection was calculated as follows: 5 states/10 years = 41
remaining states/X. X = 82. 1970 plus 82 = 2052. (Four states adopted
the Kales Plan prior to 1960).
168. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (c-d) (1879). The original citation was art.
VI, § 2, adopted on Nov. 6, 1934. See also JuDII COUNcIL OF CALFoRNIA,
1968 ANNUAL REPORT TO =nn GovEmNOR A D THm LEGISLATURE 15 [hereinafter
cited as 1968 ANNUAL REPORT].
169. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(d) (1879).
ing of state government officials: the chief justice, the attorney
general, and a justice presiding over a court-of-appeals district.
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Second, although Kales intended his selection system to operate at
the trial court level, California allows each county to adopt this
plan by majority vote for its Superior Court.1 1 Partisan elections
control the selection of judges for the other two trial courts (mu-
nicipal and justice courts) .172
During the last three years the California State Bar Association,
the Judicial Council, and Governor Ronald Reagan have sought a
constitutional revision which would elminate both of the above de-
viations and would apply the Kales program to the entire state
judicial system. 78 Under what is commonly called the merit plan
for judicial selection, the Commission on Judicial Qualifications
would be supplanted by one state-wide commission to nominate
candidates eligible for the state appellate courts and by five local
commissions to make nominations for the trial courts. Each com-
mission would consist of judges, lawyers, and laymen appointed
by the governor.174 However, since 1967 this proposal has been in-
troduced into the state legislature, which has failed to pass it.
1 7
5
The main reason for this failure may be the high national esteem
in which the California court system is already held.1 6
During the last decade legal scholars have extensively researched
the subject of judicial selection and tenure at the state' 77-as well
as the federal' 78-level. Furthermore, some academicians have ex-
170. Id. at § 7. See also 1967 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 79-85.
171. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(d) (1879).
172. Id.
173. 1968 A-iuAL. REPORT, supra note 168, at 13-18; The Merit Plan,
CAL. ST. B.J. 155-71 (1968). The latter source contains statements endorsing
this plan by Governor Ronald Reagan, then Chief Justice Roger J. Tray-
nor, State Senator Donald L. Grunsky (Chairman of the Cal. Senate Jud.
Comm.), and State Assemblyman William T. Bagley (Chairman of the As-
sembly Jud. Comm.). See also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL. ADimiN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE 33-34 (1969) [hereinafter cited as LEAGUE].
174. LEAGUE, supra note 173, at 33; P. WESTON & K. WELLS, TI1. ADxm'-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE 132-33 (1967).
175. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
176. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 168, at 18.
177. See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 24, at 139, 203; Jacob, Judicial Insulation-
Elections, Direct Participation, and Public Attention to the Courts in Wis-
consin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 801; Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences
in the Recruitment Process: the Case of State Judges, 13 J. PuB. L. 104
(1964); Jacob, The Courts as Political Agencies-an Historic Analysis, in
STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 44-46 (K. Vines & H. Jacob eds. 1962).
178. See, e.g., J. GROssMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDG S 2 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as GROSSMAN]; Chase, Federal Judges: the Appointing Process, 51
MINN. L. Rav. 185 (1966); Chase, The Johnson Administration Judicial Ap-
pointments-1963-1966, 52 MIINN. L. REV. 965 (1968); Grossman, Social Back-
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panded this behavioral research to encompass the role of bar asso-
ciations in the selection of local trial judges.179 However, very lit-
tle is empirically known about the causal connections, if any, be-
tween the various methods of judicial selection and at least fifteen
other salient variables: the formal qualifications of judges, their
informal (interpersonal) qualifications, their social backgrounds,
their ideological outlooks, their ethnicity, their party identification,
their pressure-group affiliations, their prejudicial occupations,
their ages, their education, their urbanism, their regionalism, the
turnover rate, their decisional output, and their decision-making
process-8 0 Empirical research into these hypothesized linkages
constitutes a substantial segment of the research agenda for judicial
management. In addition, legal researchers have failed to examine
normative issues posed by judicial selection-and-tenure systems-
such as enumerating the specific traits of a good judge and the pre-
case attributes of good judicial candidates. However, one commen-
tator, Joel B. Grossman, points out:
Political scientists are not alone in their failure to specify the most
desirable attributes of a good judge, or the most necessary qualifi-
cations for a prospective judge. . .. Though unable to specify
desirable judicial characteristics, political science is able to de-
scribe the attitudes toward such characteristics held by individuals
grounds and Judicial Decisions: Notes for a Theory, 29 J. PoL. 302-51
(1967); Grossman, Social Science Approaches to the "Judicial Process," 71
HARv. L. REv. 1551-94 (1966); Grossman, Federal Judicial Selection: the
Work of the ABA Committee, 8 Nw. J. POL. Sc. 8, 221-54 (1964); Ladinsky
& Grossman, Organizational Consequences of Professional Consensus: Law-
yers and Selection of Judges, ADnIN. Sci. Q. 79-106 (1966).
179. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE PoiTrcs OF THE BENCH AND BAR:
JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE iMissoui NoxuARTisAx COURT PLAN 203 (1969);
Watson, Downing & Spiegel, Bar Politics, Judicial Selection, and the Rep-
resentation of Social Interests, 61 Am. PoT. Scr. REV. 54-71 (1967); Watson,
Bar Politics and Judicial Selection, 24 J. Mo. B. 27-38, 69-79 (1968); Watson,
Lawyers' Attitudes on Judicial Selection, 72 Am. J. Soc. 373-87 (1967);
Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the Merit Plan for Selection and Ten-
ure of Judges, 52 A.B.A.J. 539-42 (1966).
180. Nagel, supra note 164, at 848-50; Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations and Judi-
cial Propensities, 24 J. POL. 109 (1962); Nagel, Testing Relations between
Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WEST. PoL. Q.
435-37 (1962); Nagel, Culture Patterns and the Judicial Systems, 16 VAta.
L. REv. 16, 147 (1962); Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, J.
Canvr. L. 335-38 (1962); Nagel, Law and the Social Sciences: What Can
Social Sciences Contribute?, 51 A.B.A.J. 357 (1965). Nagel's works have
suggested the fifteen variables to which different modes of judicial
selection and tenure may be correlated.
and groups.'13
Finally, the selection of staff members is principally a task of
choosing members for the court administrator's offices, the staff
agency through which the state supreme court (or its chief jus-
tice) manages the entire state judicial bureaucracy. Such offices
are run by a director and assistant directors, all of whom are ap-
pointed by the state supreme court (or its chief justice) to serve at
its (or his) pleasure 8 2 Furthermore, in some consolidated trial
courts, the chief judge may appoint a staff to facilitate his mana-
gerial duties .'3
G. Judicial Discipline, Removal, and Retirement: The
Complements of Judicial Selection and Tenure
A seventh facet of judicial management consists of judicial dis-
cipline, removal, and retirement. One may explore these three
deeply entwined subjects for the same reason that one treated the
various mhodes of judicial selection and tenure: the presumed
linkage between the quality of judges and the quality of court
management.18 4 However, whereas the literature on the sixth facet
is extensive, 8 5 scholarly interest in this last aspect has grown only
since 1960.186 Only the American Judicature Society has given
much consideration to the latter.
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The subject of judicial discipline and removal consists of three
main issues. One is the determination of precise criteria for evalu-
ating judicial conduct. A corollary to this issue centers on which
agency should set these standards-the state supreme court, judi-
cial councils, judicial conferences, judicial qualifications commis-
sions, the legislature, or bar associations.188 Moreover, according
to Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing, "A search of the
literature indicates that very few attempts have been made to de-
velop methods of measuring judicial performance." 1 9 Only within
the last few years have some empirical criteria for such measure-
ment been suggested-such as the percentage of lower-court deci-
sions affirmed or reversed wholly or partly on appeal, the volume
181. GRossmAI., supra note 178, at 197.
182. The Judiciary, supra note 52, at 119.
183. CouRt ADMNIsTRAToRs, supra note 142, at 2-4.
184. A. VANERBILT, supra note 49, at 3.
185. See notes 177-80 supra.
186. Am. JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JuDICIAL Discimrn A REmovAL, Rep. No.
1, 5, 22-23 (1969).
187. Am. JUDICATURE SocIETy, JUDICIAL REnimviNT AND DzsABnLny COM-
MiSSIONS 1-2 (1969).
188. SELECTED READINGS, supra note 49, at 28-29.
189. R. WATSON & R. DowNwG, supra note 179, at 273.
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of cases handled, judicial election returns, and bar-association
evaluations. 190
A second issue focuses on increasing the methods of removing
judges apart from the traditional, cumbersome devices of impeach-
ment, address, and recall. In many instances a judge may be in-
competent rather than criminally culpable. Since 1947, the salient
trend in the states has been to add one of the following two devices:
courts on the judiciary or judicial qualifications commissions. 19'
Under the former, appellate and trial court judges probe into
charges of misconduct on the bench. So far twelve states have
adopted this measure. (See Figure 7.) Under the latter, commis-
sions of judges, lawyers, and laymen perform the same function.
Eighteen states have set up such commissions with such measures
under legislative consideration in fourteen other states. 92 (See
Figure 7.) If the former trend continues at the rate of the last
twenty-three years, all the states will achieve this remedy by
2043.'11 However, if the latter trend prevails, each state will have
established a judicial qualifications commission by 2011.194
A third issue gravitates around methods of disciplining judges
short of removal. Proposed causes for such discipline include in-
dolence, refusal to carry out standard rules of procedure, inefficient
use of court time, failure to submit accurate output reports, arro-
gant conduct, and failure to render a decision shortly after a trial.
Some suggested sanctions have involved reassignment, private
reprimand, public reprimand, and temporary suspension without
pay. Moreover, there is no consensus on who should apply these
proposed forms of judicial punishment. 95 Furthermore, judicial
retirement when separated from discipline and removal, has en-
compassed three main problems: a mandatory retirement age for
judges, possible uses of retired judges, and the adequacy of pension
plans.1
96
190. Id. at 274-77.
191. See notes 186-87 supra.
192. Id.
193. This projection was calculated as follows: 12 states/23 years equals
38 remaining states/X. X equals 73. 1970 plus 73 = 2043.
194. This projection was calculated as follows: 18 states/23 years
equals 32 remaining states/X. X equals 41. 1970 plus 41 = 2011.
195. See note 188 supra.
196. Id. at 30.
Figure 7
Methods of Judicial Removal in the States




(4) Courts on the Judiciary 12
(5) Judicial Qualifications Commissions 18
(6) Special Commission for Involuntary Retirement 5
SOURCE: Based on AMERIcAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, REPORT No. 5, JUDICIAL
DIsCIPLINE AND REmOVAL, at 22-23 (1969).
To close this section, one may note that California has given at-
tention to this facet of judicial management mainly by establishing
a Commission on Judicial Qualifications in 1960.19 7 The state con-
stitution empowers this Commission to ask the state supreme court
to suspend, retire, censure, or remove a judge if he pleads or is
found guilty of a federal or state felony; reveals a serious disability
in the performance of his duties; exhibits deliberate official mis-
conduct, persistent nonfeasance, continued intemperance or conduct
reflecting adversely on his office.' 98 The last stipulation was added
to the California Constitution in 1966.199 The Commission has a
non-partisan public appearance because it consists of five judges,
which the state supreme court has appointed from three lower
courts (courts of appeal, superior courts, and municipal courts);
two attorneys appointed by the Board of Governors of the Califor-
nia Bar Association; and two laymen selected by the governor with
state senate approval. 200 Since 1961, when the Commission began
operations, it has made only one recommendation for the removal
of a judge-Charles F. Stevens, then a municipal court judge in
San Diego.201 Without explanation the highest state court in
1964 reversed this recommendation in a per curiam opinion.202 In
1968 (the latest year for which public information is available),
the Commission received 132 complaints and considered forty-eight
of them worthy of investigation. That year the Commission found
197. Amv. JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL RETnEuENT AND DISABinTTY Com-
MISSIONS AND PRocEDUns 187, Cal. sec. at 1; JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note
168, at 86-88.
198. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, §§ 8, 18 (1879).
199. Id. at § 18.
200. See U.S. NEws, supra note 1, at 11.
201. CooK, supra note 68, at 56.
202. Stevens v. Commission, 61 Cal. 2d 886, 39 Cal. Rptr. 397, 393 P.2d
709 (1964).
State Trial Courts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
no basis to recommend censuring, retiring, or removing any of the
1,030 judges under its jurisdiction. 20 3 These statistics imply that
either the judges in this state are overwhelmingly competent and
honest or that the Commission functions mainly to deflect and de-
fuse complaints against judges. Because of the uncontested high
public esteem in which the state judiciary is held,20 4 the former ex-
planation is more plausible to the author.
H. Judicial Organizations: An External View
The first seven facets of judicial management have centered on
the internal components of this field. Examination of these aspects
implies that they are about hermetically sealed from the outside
environment of two other organizations: the police and the cor-
rectional agencies. Judicial organizations constitute one segment
of a tripartite justice system. Because these three kinds of organi-
zations interact pervasively, one must view state trial courts not
only internally but also externally in order to understand better
why they are faltering bureaucracies. Therefore, under an eighth
facet of judicial management, one must consider whether state trial
court bureaucracies can co-ordinate their work with the rest of the
justice system.
During the last two years there have been at least four notable
public appeals for such co-ordination. The first came, in 1968, from
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Admin-
istration of Justice, which commented:
The criminal justice system has three separately organized parts-
the police, the courts, and corrections-and each has distinct tasks.
However, these parts are by no means independent of each other.
What each one does and how it does it has a direct effect on the
work of the others. The court must deal, and can only deal, with
those whom the police arrest; the business of corrections is with
those delivered to it by the courts. How successfully corrections
reforms convicts determines whether they will once again become
police business and influences the sentences the judges pass; police
activities are subject to court scrutiny and are often determined by
court decisions. And so reforming or reorganizing any part or pro-
cedure of the system changes other parts or procedures. . .. A
study of the system must begin by examining it as a whole.20 5
203. See U.S. NEws, supra note 1, at 13.
204. CooK, supra note 68, at 54.
205. PRsEIDENT's COMm'N, supra note 38, at 71. See also G. SCHUBERT,
JUDICIAL PoLIcy-MAKING 105-07 (1965).
The second public call emanated from the National Commission
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, which, as previously
noted, condemned the inefficiency of the systemic disarray by re-
marking:
It is commonly assumed that .. three components-law enforce-
ment (police, sheriffs, marshalls), the judicial process (judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers) and corrections (prison officials,
probation, and parole officers)-add up to a system of criminal
justice.
A system implies some unity of purpose and organized interre-
lationship among component parts. In the typical American city
and state, and under federal jurisdiction as well, no such relation-
ship exists. There is, instead, a reasonably well-defined criminal
process, a continuum through which each accused offender may
pass: from the hands of the police, to the jurisdiction of the courts,
behind the walls of a prison, then back on to the street. The in-
efficiency, fall-out and failure of purpose during this process is
notorious.2 06
The third was Chief Justice Burger's recent speech to the Amer-
ican Bar Association, where he furnished an example of poor sys-
temic co-ordination:
[Tihe system of justice must be viewed as a process embracing
every phase from crime prevention at the beginning through ar-
rest, trial and the correctional system. We can no longer limit our
responsibility to providing defense services for the judicial proc-
ess alone and yet continue to be miserly with the needs of correc-
tional-institution probation and parole system.20 7
The fourth appeal emanated most recently from criminologist
Robert Carter, who pinpointed some critical systemic deficiencies:
[T]here is no single system of criminal justice in the United
States .... 208
[O]ur systems of criminal justice are fragmented non-systems
... tied together by the processing of an increasing number of
criminal offenders.... In any event, overall, the non-systems are
marked by an unequal quality of justice, inadequate fiscal and
manpower resources, shortages in equipment and facilities, lack of
relevant research and evaluation to provide some measure of ef-
fectiveness and, until recently, a general indifference ... on the
part of the public which the systems were designed to serve.209
Although Carter was explicitly discussing only the criminal justice
system, his analysis readily extends to the civil litigation and en-
206. FINAL REPORT OF THE PREsmENT's CoMM'N ON THE CAusEs AND PRE-
VENTION OF VIOLENcE 128 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
207. See U.S. NEws, supra note 1, at 71.
208. Carter, A System for the Non-system of Criminal Justice, (unpub-
lished monograph) at 1 [hereinafter cited as Carter]. A copy of this mono-
graph was given to the author by Dr. G. Thomas Gitchoff, Assistant Pro-
fessor of Public Administration and Urban Studies at San Diego State
College.
209. Id. at 2.
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forcement; for criminal and civil matters are inextricably linked.
210
So far only one tentative proposal for achieving such co-ordina-
tion has publicly emerged from these appeals. The President's
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence recently
suggested the establishment of a criminal justice office at the state
and federal levels. It offers the following rationale for this recom-
mendation:
The pervasive fragmentation of police, court and correction agen-
cies suggest that some catalyst is needed to bring them together.
An assumption that parallel and overlapping public agencies will
co-operate efficiently can no longer suffice as a substitute for de-
liberate action to make it happen in real life ...
Whatever its form, the basic purposes of the criminal justice
office would be to do continuing planning, to assure effective proc-
essing of cases, and to develop better functioning relationships
among the criminal justice sub-systems and with public and private
agencies outside the criminal justice system.
211
More specifically, such an office would perform several func-
tions-such as devising methods of reducing police time spent in
state trial courts, garnering information for determining the advis-
ability of pre-trial releases for defendants, and inducing prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys to expedite trials. 212 In addition, such
an office might help to effectuate uniform sentencing procedures
for the same offenses 213 and might administer victim compensation
programs.
21 4
Such an office, at the local level, could occupy one of two possible
bureaucratic positions. First, it could operate as a mayoral staff
agency. However, in this position such an agency would probably
be ineffective unless mayors were granted substantial co-ordinating
powers which they could exercise through this agency. Second, it
could function as a line agency under the supervision of a highly
placed local official (such as a director of public safety) or under
the aegis of a committee, which would consist of police, court, cor-
210. JAT.s, supra note 123, at 244.
211. See FNAL REPORT, supra note 206, at 137-38.
212. Id. at 138.
213. Mapes, Unequal Justice: A Growing Disparity in Criminal Sen-
tences Troubles Legal Experts, The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1970, at 1,
13 [hereinafter cited as Mapes].
214. W. Pinkerton, Jr., Hiding the Innocent: More States Award Cash
Compensation to Victims of Crime, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 1970,
at 1, 16.
rectional, political, and private interests. Such a committee might
delegate much of its power to a chairman in order to work more
efficiently.
215
The need for such co-ordination is becoming more exigent.
For instance, a research group at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia has predicted that the justice system in Los Angeles County
will cease to function by 1985. The trial court system of this county
has been plagued with growing congestion for the last five years. 210
This prediction rested on three assumptions. First, the trend in the
1960-1968 crime rates for the county remains unchanged. Second,
the population growth of this county continues at the same rate for
this eight-year period. Third, the intake of offenders by the system
remains the same. The computer analysis of this data yielded
this prediction for Los Angeles County.21 7 Moreover, an adjacent
county, Orange, may be approaching the same predicament partly
because of its judicial congestion.218
Carter, who is also a member of this group, implies that an office
of justice or another co-ordinating agency in this area can function
more efficiently if it takes at least four steps. First, it constructs a
meticulous flow chart of the justice system.21 9 Second, it identifies
the input rates of people into the system and the transfer of people
from one segment (or decision-point) of the system to another.
220
Third, it must uncover the variables which operate on both rates-
such as police arrest policies, bail procedures, sentencing orienta-
tions, 221 and probation department rules. Fourth, an agency must
be empowered to change these rates, if necessary, after they have
been discovered.
222
So far no state or locality has attempted to superintend the in-
terlocking elements of the criminal justice system, although such
co-ordinative efforts in two California Counties (Los Angeles and
Orange) are beginning. 23 In California, one may speculate about
215. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 206, at 137.
216. See e.g., Lawson, Court Efficiency, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 22-29 (1965);
Nix, Civil Court Congestion in the Superior Court of California for the
County of Los Angeles, 55 GEo. L.J. 1018-29 (1967); Nye, New Approach to
an Old Problem: Congestion in Our Courts, 45 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 325
(1970).
217. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § B at 1, 4. The members of this
research group are Alex McEachern, Robert M. Carter, Harvey Adelman,
and J. Robert Newman.
218. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 11, 1970, pt. 2, at 1.
219. Carter, supra note 208, at 2-3.
220. Id. at 4.
221. Mapes, supra note 213, at 1, 13.
222. Carter, supra note 208, at 6.
223. R. MYrEN, EDUCATION IN CRIMINAL JusTicE 25-26 (1969); Kramer,
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several possible routes to this objective. First, county boards of
supervisors might be authorized to co-ordinate the work of the crim-
inal justice system by control over the finances and personnel of
these segments. Second, the powers of the Judicial Council might
be extended from the courts to the police and correctional agencies
of the state and might also include overseeing the criminal justice
operations of the county boards of supervisors. However, both pro-
posals may not be politically feasible at this time because the city
police departments, the county sheriff departments, the Probation
Department and the Youth Authority would almost certainly op-
pose and lobby against their loss of power through these reorgani-
zation plans. Third, what may be politically attainable is a crim-
inal justice council with the highest statewide authority (sub-
ject to the legislature and the governor) and with ex officio repre-
sentation from the various state and county agencies in the exist-
ing criminal justice system. To reduce the likelihood of unwieldi-
ness, such a council could appoint a director and an assistant to
him with wide latitude and with tenure of two or three years.
This proposal may be more feasible because the existing criminal
justice agencies will have a significant stake in it through their
representatives. Moreover, such a council may help to mold and
implement consensus in this area. This layering near the apex of
this system may be an answer to the need for more co-ordination.
However, extensive constitutional revision will be sine qua non
for such a council.
IV.
THE PROSPECTS FOR JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT AT THE
STATE T'RIAL COURT LEVEL
Judicial management at the state level has remained a neglected
sector of the legal profession despite its growing significance. At
least three enduring factors may reduce this neglect: the sheer
size of the state trial courts, the magnitude of their output, and
their pervasive impact on public policy. Each factor has helped
to publicize serious shortcomings in the operations of judicial organ-
izations, especially at the state level. However, it is unlikely that
most of these failures will be remedied because most of the dissatis-
Criminal Justice R & D: New Agency Stresses Police Over Corrections,
166 SCIENCE 589 (1969); Los Angeles Times, Oct. 2, 1970, pt. 2, at 8.
faction is exhibited by segments of the legal profession rather than
by the general public.22 4  For judicial management at this level,
there are at least eight facets: court organization (or consolida-
tion); abolition of fee offices; judicial leadership; court congestion;
judicial staff functions; judicial selection and tenure; judicial dis-
cipline, removal, and retirement; and judicial co-ordination. In
considering the prospects for judicial management, especially at
the state level, let us center on four issues: its relation to the sali-
ent goals of a judicial system, its cohesion as a discipline, its re-
search agenda, and recommendations for interim actions.
A. Salient Goals of a Judicial System
These eight facets of judicial management have often been ex-
amined as if they were simply technical devices and ends in them-
selves.225 Moreover, scholars have neglected to explore possible re-
lationships between these facets and the general goals of a judicial
system, although they have written about each area separately.
220
There is a general consensus among academicians that a judicial
system operates to achieve at least eight principal overlapping
goals:227
1. The formulation and enforcement of common morality
2. Impartiality in such enforcement
3. Efficiency (or competence) in such enforcement
4. Preservation of substantial individual liberty
5. Limiting the scope of lawful governmental conduct
6. Peaceful resolution of differences among competing in-
terests in society
7. Order (or stability)
8. Promotion of the social welfare
224. JAcoB, supra note 24, at 203.
225. See notes 49, 50, 216 supra.
226. Id. For some sources focusing on the general goals of a judicial sys-
tem, see B. CARwozo, THE NATURE or TnE JUDICIAL PRocEss 67, 72 (1921)
[hereinafter cited as B. CARDozo]; D. EASTON, A SYsEmvs ANALYSIS or
POLrICAL LIrE 264-65 (1965); L. FULLER, THE LAw 3x QUEST OF ITSELF, 135,
137 (1940); L. FULLER, THE MoRAuaTY or LAw 41-94 (1964); H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 1-6 (1963); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
REsPONSmImTY: ESSAYS nT THE PHmosoPHY oF LAw 2 (1968); Herndon,
The Role of the Judiciary in State Political Systems, JUDCIAL BEHAVIOR:
A READER iN THEORY AND RESEARCH 156, 158 (G. Schubert ed. 1964); JACoB,
supra note 24, at 17-25; Meek, The Distribution of Justice, KIroNFSKr &
MENDELSOHN, supra note 24, at 20-24; E. SCHUR, LAw AND SoCIxTy 17, 152
(1968); SKOLNiCm, supra note 35, at 313-26.
227. See note 226 supra.
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The first five goals were enumerated in a descending order of ab-
straction-from general to specific. The last three goals are prob-
ably by-products of accomplishing the first five. Recently Herbert
Jacob succinctly interrelated most of these goals; for he com-
mented:
The administration of justice is essential to an ordered society.
What is generally meant by administration of justice is that norms
are enforced in an even-handed way so that the same standards
are applied to all citizens. Every society has norms of behavior
that it enforces .... Ordinary citizens must be protected in their
peaceable pursuits, yet they must be prevented from harming
others.... The manner in which judges apply legal norms gives
them an influential voice in molding the norms.228
A salient task facing scholars is to measure the extent to which
the facets of judicial management help to realize the general goals
of a judicial system. Despite a lack of empirical data specifying
connections between these aspects and objectives, one may still
speculate briefly about some possible nexes. For instance, court
organization (or consolidation) is most likely to promote efficiency.
The abolition of fee offices helps to achieve not only the same
goal but also the peaceful resolution of differences. Judicial leader-
ship contributes to the accomplishment of impartiality as well as
efficiency. Devices for reducing trial court delay offer the same ad-
vantages as judicial leadership because the former constitutes a
central function of the latter. Similarly, staffs (court administra-
tor's offices) probably increase efficiency. Finally, the modes of
judicial selection; the procedures for judicial discipline, removal,
and retirement; as well as policies for co-ordinating the efforts of
the courts, the police, and correctional agencies promote all these
goals-probably in widely differing degrees.
B. Judicial Management as a Discipline
Two noted academicians Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus,
contend that a discipline has three main characteristics: a certain
state of mind, a formal organization, and a gallery of notables.229
By this definition, judicial management may qualify as a discipline.
Its state of mind regards judicial organizations as essentially like
228. JAcOB, supra note 4, at 17, 23.
229. A. Sorr & J. TxmmAus, A1irsncAw POLIrmcAL ScINcE: A PRoFmE
OF A DisciipinE 2-6 (1964).
all other forms of bureaucracy and as merely another species of
the same genus. Therefore, judicial organizations encounter the
same kinds of interrelated problems facing other public as well as
corporate organizations-such as specialization; delegation; unity
of command; span of control; layering; different bases for organiza-
tion (purpose, process, place, and clientele); staff functions; bud-
geting; work measurement; data processing; personnel selection;
leadership; and human relations. Judicial management also pos-
sesses two kinds of formal organizations. One kind consists of a
body of knowledge with regard to its eight principal facets. The
other kind consists of associations unique to this area-such as the
American Judicature Society 230 and the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration.231 Finally, this field contains a gallery of notables-
such as Roscoe Pound, the first prominent exponent of court con-
solidation; 232 Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the first chief justice to man-
age a statewide consolidated court system;23 3 Albert M. Kales,
an innovator in judicial selection;23 4 Glenn R. Winters, a thorough
chronicler of this field for the American Judicature Society; 2 and
a series of scholars who impressionistically or empirically illumi-
nated the many ramifications of judicial decision-making: Benja-
min Cardozo, 236 Jerome Frank,237 Rodney Mott, 238 Charles Her-
man Pritchett, 239 Glendon Schubert,240 John Schmidhauser,241 S.
Sidney Ulmer,242 Stuart S. Nagel,243 Walter F. Murphy, 244 Joseph
Tanenhaus, 245 Hans Zeisel,240 and Maurice Rosenberg.247 Judicial
management may have enough of each characteristic to be called
a discipline. It certainly qualifies as a significant sector of the legal
profession.
230. The American Judicature Society, 1155 E. 60th St., Third Floor,
Chicago, fll., 60637.
231. The Institute of Judicial Administration, New York University, 40
Washington Square South, New York, N.Y. 10012.
232. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice, 46 J. Am-. Jui. Soc'Y 62-63 (1962).
233. VANDERBILT, supra note 77, at 13; N.J. CONsT. art. VI, § 1 (1948).
234. KALES, supra note 161, at 245-47.
235. SELECTED READINGs, supra note 49, at 71-82.
236. B. CARDOZO, supra note 226, at 19-25.
237. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MoDnPa MND 108-26 (1963); FRANK, supra
note 22, at 316-25.
238. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 295-315 (1936).
239. C. PRITCHETT, Tm ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND VALUE
1937-1947 at 32-45, 89, 242-63 (1948).
240. G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIL MID 273-88 (1965).
241. J. Sc~mmDHAusEm, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS PoLITIcS, PERSONALITIES,
AND PROCEDURES 30-59 
(1960).
242. Ulmer, An Analysis, of Behavior Patterns on the United States Su-
preme Court, 22 J. PoL. 629-53 (1960).
243. See notes 164, 180 supra.
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C. A Research Agenda
The neglect of judicial management by legal scholars implies that
the research agenda for this sector is substantial, even the wide-
spread establishment of court administrator's offices facilitates
such research. Let us briefly review the research agenda for the
eight main facets of this speciality.
In the area of court consolidation, the prime task of legal schol-
ars is to measure its impact, if any, on trial court congestion. Re-
searchers will encounter difficulity in isolating such consolidation
from other variables-such as improved leadership, better staffs,
more personnel, and more facilities. Scholars may want to com-
pare the perceptions of judges, lawyers, and law professors about
the efficacy of such consolidations with the objective data on the
caseloads. Survey and statistical research will be most helpful in
this area.
24 8
In the area of fee offices, researchers face two main tasks: to
measure the extent to which these offices contribute to trial court
congestion and to compare the costs of a fee-office system with
those of a consolidated court structure in order to determine the
relative worth of each one. The research techniques applicable to
the area of court consolidations are also germane to this area.24
9
In the area of judicial leadership, scholars confront the largest
number of major tasks with the widest number of research instru-
ments. At least six main research problems loom: to delineate
empirically the functions of the judicial executive, to compare his
functions with those of other executives, to determine leadership
styles, to analyze the efficacy of various managerial strategems,
to explore further the nature of judicial decision-making in the
handling of cases and managerial problems, and to compare the
decision-making processes of judges with those of other execu-
tives.250 The composite of methodologies germane to the other two
244. W. MURPHY, THE ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 122 (1964).
245. Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions, 79 HAv.
L. REv. 1583-94 (1966).
246. See note 136 supra.
247. See notes 113, 134, 136 supra.
248. H. EULAU, Tim BEHAvIoRAL PERSUASION IN PoLTIcs 33-34 (1963).
249. Id.
250. Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes toward Federal Administrative
areas are also useful in this area along with two other approaches:
the participant-observer technique and case studies.
25 1
In the areas of judicial congestion, investigators face two difficult
problems: first, to formulate a universal, operational definition of
delay in order to make possible the comparison of backlog data
from the numerous trial court jurisdictions and, second, to test the
numerous proposed solutions or palliatives for such delay under
rigorous, laboratory conditions in order to measure the effective-
ness of each proposal. Theoretically, most experimental designs
would make such testing possible.252 However, Zeisel and his col-
leagues perceive what is probably an insurmountable barrier to
this approach; for they comment:
The most precise way of measuring the differential effects of alter-
native solutions for an administrative problem is the controlled
experiment. Since it involves the inclusion of randomly selected
cases in the experiment, and the exclusion of others, the official
legal experiment poses a problem of equal treatment under the
law.2 5 3
Therefore, in lieu of such experimentation, researchers may have
to rely on such surrogates as simulations, participant-observer
work, and survey research.
2 54
In the area of staff functions, the primary task of scholars is to
examine the interactions of the formal judicial leadership and court
administrators in order to ascertain whether the latter is assuming
de facto leadership because of expertise and indispensability. If
a judicial technostructure exists, a second task will result: to com-
pare it with other technostructures. In this area the most helpful
techniques may be simulations and case studies. 25
r
In the area of judicial selection and tenure, the central problem
for researchers is to measure the inputs and outputs of each selec-
tion and tenure system. More specifically, scholars will have to
correlate each mode of selection and tenure with at least fifteen
other salient variables: the formal qualifications of judges, their
Agencies, 1947-56-an Application of Social Science Methods to the Study
of the Judicial Process, 14 VAm. L. REV. 473-502 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Tanenhaus]; Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PuB.
ADInm. REV. 79-88 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Lindblom].
251. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A
DEMocATIC SoCIETY 30-41 (1967).
252. F. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS O BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 275-355 (1964);
Ross & Smith, Orthodox Experimental Designs, METHODOLOGY IN SOCIAL
RESEARCH 352-63 (H. Blalock & A. Blalock eds. 1968).
253. ZEisEL, KALVEi, & BUCnHOLZ, supra note 114, at 241.
254. See notes 251-53 supra.
255. Tanenhaus, supra note 250, at 473-75.
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informal qualifications, their social backgrounds, their ideological
proclivities, their ethnicity, their party identification, their pres-
sure-group connections, their pre-judicial employment, their out-
puts, their ages, their education, their urbanism, their regionalism,
turnover rates, and their decision-making modes. Among the meth-
odologies applicable to this area are factor analysis, Gutman, corre-
lations, and simulations.
256
In the area of judicial discipline, removal, and retirement, schol-
ars confront three prime issues: formulating empirical criteria for
measuring judicial conduct, gauging the effectiveness of the various
devices for removing judges from office, and determining the effi-
cacy of the numerous disciplinary options short of removal. The
methodologies applicable to the previous area also fit this one.257
In the area of judicial co-ordination, researchers probably face
the most serious difficulties because they must examine not merely
one kind of organization (courts) but also two other types (police
and corrections). At least four principal issues loom: the flow of
cases through the criminal justice system, input rates for and
transfer rates within the system, the ascertainment of rate deter-
minants, and the enumeration of managerial strategies for efficient
interventions in this system. 258 Among the methodologies appli-
cable to this area are survey and statistical research, the partici-
pant-observer technique, correlations, factor analysis, and simu-
lations.
259
Finally, among the areas for further research in judicial man-
agement are the following three: ecology, systems, and small
groups. Ecology confronts investigators with at least two main
problems: to measure the impact of intra- and extra-cultural
forces on judicial organizations and to compare such entities cross-
culturally. 260 Systems entails the study of judicial organizations
as circuits with inputs, outputs, and feedback and as inputs or out-
256. See notes 250-52 supra.
257. Id.
258. Carter, supra note 208, at 1-10.
259. See notes 135-38 supra.
260. See, e.g., M. GLUCKMVA, THE JuDIcIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAtorS. OF
NORTHERN RHODESIA 357-66 (1955); P. BOHANNON, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT
AMONG THE Trv 208-14 (1957); Ayoub, Review: The Judicial Process in Two
African Tribes, CoiVnuxrrY POLrmcA SysamWs 237-50 (M. Janowitz ed.
1961).
puts of a larger system. For these two overlapping areas, survey re-
search, simulations, and participant-observer techniques are among
the relevant methodologies. 26 1  Small group research focuses on
the informal norms and sanctions governing the behavior of judges.
Even though small group research entails study at a microlevel
rather than at the macrolevel of the other two areas, the metho-
dologies overlap. 262
D. The Efficacy of Some Interim Recommendations
For at least two significant reasons one may question the desira-
bility of making interim recommendations regarding the eight
principal facets of judicial management, especially at the state
trial court level. First, the research agenda for this field is so ex-
tensive that it is unlikely to be finished within the next decade.
Moreover, this slowness will probably continue despite the vastly
increased expenditures for this field by such recently created agen-
cies as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the
Urban Observatory at the national level and the California Council
on Criminal Justice at the state level. Even if much money is
available, two questions arise: Can judicial organizations have the
necessary research done for them? Are there scholars who are
willing and able to conduct such investigations? Because this field
is not yet well known, the answer to both questions for the next
few years may be negative. Second, recommendations in this area
may become readily outmoded. For instance, the author made a
series of projections based on the continuation of current trends:
'consolidation without central management in all the states by 1997,
consolidation with such management by 2018, the abolition of all
fee offices by 1985, the establishment of court administrator's of-
fices in all states by 1985, the adoption of the Kales plan in all
states by 2052, the creation of courts on the judiciary in each by
2043, and the establishment of judicial qualifications commissions
in such states by 2011. However, despite these trends, the criminal
justice system in Los Angeles County may grind to a halt by 1985 if
the current trend holds. These projections raise questions whether
the judicial management problems may outstrip the solutions that
have so far been proposed and whether these suggestions are far
too narrow and technical to alter this system much. Further-
more, since these projections focus on the efficacy of long-term
remedies, which may be dubious, will not the enumeration of in-
terim recommendations be even more tangential?
261. Tanenhaus, supra note 250, at 473-75.
262. Id.; Nagel, Sbciometric Relations among American Courts, 43 Sw.
Soc. Sci. Q. 136-42 (Sept. 1962).
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The author believes that the answer to the last question is nega-
tive for at least three reasons. First, as the sections of this article
indicate, much is already known about the facets of this discipline
even though that knowledge may constitute only a pittance of what
scholars should have ascertained. Second, even though the re-
search agenda may remain unfinished for the near future, judicial
executives and their staffs-along with police and correctional of-
ficials-must still make continual salient decisions, often with lit-
tle or no data available to them. Even no decision would be a deci-
sion to perpetuate the fragmented judicial status quo.263 Judicial
decision-making is inescapable even in an informational vacuum.
Third, the trends of the fifteen years for the adoption of the above
programs by the states may accelerate considerably as the urgency
of judicial management problems begins to seep through the wall of
public neglect. Therefore, let us conclude this article by listing
some interim recommendations for buttressing this field:
1. In the writer's view the states must consolidate their court
systems with central management as soon as possible. Those states
like California which have achieved only partial consolidation must
soon consummate it by supplanting the Superior, Municipal, and
Justice Courts with a single trial court (such as a circuit court)
with exclusive, comprehensive, original jurisdiction within each
county. This mode of consolidation may be more feasible than the
alternative method of having one court (such as the Superior
Courts) absorb the functions and personnel of the remaining courts.
2. An integral concomitant of such consolidation is the abolition
of fee offices and the absorption of their personnel into a unified
system. In California justice court officials might be kept as magis-
trates in consolidated trial courts. Such a proposal might mitigate
their opposition to the elimination of their tribunals.
3. All consolidated trial courts need presiding or chief judges to
serve as court managers. A fully consolidated system in California
would require the continuation of such executives.
4. Such a unified court system would need to experiment with
the numerous delay-reducing proposals which Zeisel empirically
studied in the Supreme Court of New York County (Manhattan)
263. See Lindblom, supra note 250, at 79-88; SimON, supra note 80, at
97-99; KAYLEs, supra note 161, at 210-11, 217-18.
during the late 1950's. His study needs replication in most large-
city trial court jurisdictions in order to ascertain the feasibility of
these suggestions in differing locales. In California, such studies
would have to be conducted in its largest cities: Los Angeles, San
Diego, and San Francisco.
5. The remaining fifteen states should adopt a court adminis-
trator's office as a source of judicial expertise and as an incipient
step in the formation of judicial technostructures, especially at the
trial court level. In California the Judicial Council and its Ad-
ministrative Office satisfy this requirement.
6. The states should enact the Kales plan of judicial selection
and tenure in order to insulate them further from partisan politics.
In California the integrated bar and Governor Ronald Reagan,
with their merit plan, have pressed for this change.
7. The remaining states should establish judicial qualifications
commisions in order to retire, remove, or discipline senile, corrupt,
and incompetent judges, especially at the trial court level. Cali-
fornia has followed this suggestion.
8. The states must seek to integrate their entire criminal jus-
tice systems by placing the courts, police departments, and correc-
tional agencies under central direction. Judicial consolidation is a
prerequisite for criminal justice consolidation. The police and
correctional agencies may need statewide unification before the
larger reorganization becomes possible. Such criminal justice uni-
fication may be most politically feasible if it operates as a council
with ex officio members from the various state and county organi-
zations in this field and with a director and assistant director. So
far no state, including California, has publicly considered such co-
ordinating steps. Finally, to achieve such a program within the
next decade, intensive public sponsorship by governors, both par-
ties, the state and local bar associations, and the press will be a
requisite for assembling the will, the money, and the expertise that
are also critical concomitants. If such a political and legal con-
sensus does not emerge within the next decade, Chief Justice Bur-
ger's fear of an impending breakdown in the federal criminal jus-
tice system264 may occur first at the state level. At that juncture
an odyssey into the state trial courts will be too late for these bu-
reaucracies will have faltered completely.
264. See U.S. Nsws, supra note 1, at 68.
